



CHINA: Engagement Tracker JAN 21 (U)

J22-Great Power Competition | Amy Clark


5 FEB 2021

DIPLOMACY



- 1 Afghanistan: On 6 January, Beijing arranged the departure of at least ten Chinese nationals arrested in Afghanistan in December on espionage and terror charges (with purported ties to HQN). The detainees reportedly left Afghanistan after a meeting between China's Ambassador to Afghanistan and Afghanistan VP Saleh, prompting parliamentary criticism. Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security confirmed the arrest of a Chinese network; China's Foreign Ministry denied awareness of the detainees' departure. (U)
- 2 Turkmenistan: On 6 January, the new Chinese Ambassador to Turkmenistan met with Turkmenistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs to discuss resuming regular Foreign Ministry exchanges and strengthening political, economic, and cultural ties with Turkmenistan. (U)
- 3 Kyrgyzstan: On 10 January, China's Foreign Ministry congratulated Sadyr Japarov on winning Kyrgyzstan's presidential election, stating China will continue to deepen mutually-beneficial cooperation and promote China's comprehensive strategic partnership with Kyrgyzstan. (U)
- 4 Afghanistan: On 21 January, China's Ambassador to Afghanistan met with the head of the Taliban's Qatar office, Mullah Beradar, on the Afghan peace process, according to the Taliban political office's social media. Mullah Beradar also requested a Chinese Covid-19 vaccination program. (U)
- 5 Region: In January, China increased its Covid-19 distribution in the AOR. The UAE announced plans to manufacture Sinopharm's vaccine, which it began providing to its citizens last month. Iraq, Pakistan, and Jordan approved Sinopharm's vaccine for emergency use. Jordan and Egypt began vaccinating frontline medical workers with the vaccine. China agreed to gift Pakistan 500,000 Sinopharm doses and promised to deliver the 1.2 million doses Pakistan ordered by February. CanSino offered Pakistan preferential pricing and access for up to 20 million doses after wrapping up its third phase trials in the country. Iran also announced it will receive Chinese vaccine doses by late March. (U)

AOR MAP (U)



INFORMATION



- 1 Pakistan: On 27 January, China's Ambassador to Pakistan and Pakistan's China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Chair announced the launch of a platform to share agricultural and industrial information to promote private sector cooperation. (U)

MILITARY



- 1 Uzbekistan: On 13 January, China's Center for Language Education and Cooperation began providing Chinese language instruction to Uzbek National Guard cadets in Uzbekistan. (U)
- 2 Pakistan: On 15 January, a Chinese defense contractor delivered five CH-4 unmanned aerial vehicles to the Pakistan Army, based on media reports citing export-import records. Reporting did not indicate whether Pakistan acquired the armed (CH-4B) or unarmed (CH-4A) models. Pakistan joins Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE as a CH-4 operator in the region. (U)

ECONOMY



- 1 Saudi Arabia: On 18 January, China's Huawei signed a lease to open its largest overseas store in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, at which it will showcase its 5G and artificial intelligence technologies. (U)
- 2 Pakistan: On 20 January, China's Ambassador to Pakistan discussed CPEC with Pakistani Planning, Development, and Special Initiative officials, noting CPEC is heading in the right direction. A day earlier, media reported the annual Joint Cooperation Committee, initially delayed due to the pandemic, would be further delayed for up to three months due to Main Line 1 project and special economic zone agreement challenges. (U)
- 3 Iran: On 23 January, Chinese company Iran-China Investment Development Group denied Iranian government officials' accusations that its Bitcoin mining farm in Iran caused major power outages in Tehran in early January. The company blamed Iranian electricity system inefficiencies, but halted operations for two weeks. The criticism highlighted internal rifts within the Iranian government over China's economic role. (U)

AOR EVENTS OF NOTE (U)





AFGHANISTAN: Ethnic Powerbrokers Likely Hedging to Protect Parochial Interests (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMMA)

J22-Afghanistan |

(b)(6)

21 February 2021

(b)(1)1.4c

SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMMA

Afghan Powerbrokers Discussing New Alliance

(b)(1)1.4c

Powerbrokers	Ethnicity	Affiliation
 Abdul Rashid Dostum	Uzbek	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Former 1st VP Foremost Uzbek National leader
 Nizamudeen Qaisari	Uzbek	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Influential militia leader in Faryab
 Mohammad Atta Noor	Tajik	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Popular following, large militia in N. AFG.
 Mohammed Mohaqqeq	Hazara	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Large following among Hazara Influence with militia leaders
 Ismail Khan	Tajik	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Popular in Herat, western AFG Likely able to muster large militia
 Yunus Qanuni	Tajik	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Influential with Panjshiri Tajik militia commanders
 Abdul Karim Khalili	Hazara	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Large following among Hazara Likely able to muster large militia

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

Ghani also appointed Dostum's daughter, Rahila, to the Meshraṇo Jirga (Upper House) and appointed Rais Hashem, former head of Dostum's bodyguard, as the governor of Jowzjan, consummating a round of negotiations, which began in September 2020.^{15,16}

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Improved powerbroker and GIRoA cohesion is almost certainly dependent on U.S. and Coalition assurances of diplomatic and military support beyond May 2021. Powerbrokers believe the Taliban is not negotiating in good faith, and lack confidence in ANDSF's ability to secure Afghanistan without international support. Additionally, they worry that if a deal is struck, Pashtun political elites will eventually align with Taliban along ethnic lines, leaving minority groups at a disadvantage in a post-peace agreement in Kabul.¹⁷

(b)(1)1.4c

These statements likely reflect a sentiment among Afghans that the Taliban will continue to pursue a military victory despite ongoing talks.

(b)(1)1.4c

(U//FOUO) Coordinated with: APRC4, CJIOC-A
(U//FOUO) With contributions from: (b)(6)
(U) SHARING POC: USCENTCOM FDO, Call (b)(6)

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(U) Analytic Tradecraft Summary

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

¹² (U) Ariana News; 20210118; (U) Dostum Returns to the Battlefield to Fight the Taliban; Classification of extracted material is U; Overall classification is U; (U) Source is press reporting

(b)(1)1.4c

¹⁵ (U) Ariana News; 20210120; (U) Ghani appoints critics to avoid interim govt: politicians; Classification of extracted material is U; Overall classification is U; (U) Source is press reporting.

¹⁶ (U) Pajhwok Afghan News; 20210106; (U) Raees takes charge as Jawzjan governor, replaces Azizi; Classification of extracted material is U; Overall classification is U; (U) Source is press reporting.

(b)(1)1.4c

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CAS: Security Cooperation Expansion Likely Following U.S. Departure From Afghanistan (S//NF)

J22 - Central Asian States |

(b)(6)

08 MAR 2021

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

(U) ASSESSED AFGHANISTAN SECURITY PERCEPTIONS ON CAS

(b)(1)1.4c

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Afghan officials seek a mutually beneficial security relationship with their CAS neighbors, focused on improving border security, expanding economic activity and gaining military aid. Kabul often exaggerates the Islamic militant threat in northern Afghanistan in an effort to extract greater aid commitments from their CAS neighbors. Kabul maintains several security cooperation agreements with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and pursues international involvement such as obtaining Observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

(b)(3)50USC3024(i)

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d

CAS geographic location as a crossroads between great power competitors highlights the geopolitical importance of its multilateral agreements, mainly through organizations such as the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), according to historical diplomatic reporting.⁹ (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(3)50USC3024(i)

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

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(S//NF) CAS and GPC Security Cooperation and U.S. Opportunities

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Members



- China-led, regional security organization (U)
- SCO focus on regional development throughout the Central Asian States. (U)

Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Members



- Russia-led, counter-NATO organization (U)
- CSTO prohibits member states from allowing foreign governments to operate within its territory, without CSTO permission (U)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

ICOD: 20210304
 Classified by: (b)(6)
 Derived from: Multiple Sources
 Declassify on: 50X1-HUM

SECRET//HCS-P//ORCON-USGOV/NOFORN

(U) Analytic Tradecraft Summary

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

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(b)(3)50USC3024(i)

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

ASSESSED AFGHANISTAN SECURITY PERCEPTIONS ON CAS – Tone Box Sources:

(U) OSC; (b)(3)50USC3024(i) 281732Z FEB 20; (U) Afghanistan: Hopes for Peace Falter as Violence Continues: Rahmani; Overall classification is U; extracted information is U; Source is Kabul TOLONews, a website of privately owned Tolo News television channel; pursues a neutral and objective editorial policy.

(b)(1)1.4c

(U) TOLONews; No Serial; 25 JANUARY 2017; Afghanistan, Uzbekistan Sign Five Cooperation Agreements; Overall classification is U; extracted information is U; Source is Kabul TOLONews, a website of privately owned Tolo News television channel; pursues a neutral and objective editorial policy.

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

(U) Collective Security Treaty Organization; Accessed 19 JAN 2021; *Basic Facts* (U); Overall classification is (U); Official website of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

(U) EVN Report; 06 OCT 2019; *Fact Sheet: What is the Collective Security Organization?* (U); Overall classification is (U); From website: EVN Report is an independent, non-profit online weekly magazine. We offer a mix of reporting, analysis and commentary on politics, economy, culture, tech and innovation, the arts, as well as compelling narratives, podcasts and multimedia storytelling. <https://www.evnreport.com/understanding-the-region/fact-sheet-what-is-the-collective-security-treaty-organization>

(U) Shanghai Cooperation Organization Website; Accessed 21 JAN 2021; <http://eng.sectsco.org>

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3)50USC3024(i)



AFGHANISTAN: Assessing Indicators of ANDSF Collapse (S//REL TO USA, RSMA)

J22-Afghanistan |

(b)(6)

16 APR 2021



OBSERVED INDICATORS

1 JAN - 31 MAR 2021

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

JAN – MAR: Departure of senior security leaders; Pilots deserting
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY, NATO)

- At least 5 senior security officials left Afghanistan to join families overseas ¹ (c)

(b)(1)1.4c

➤

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

- 9 AAF pilots quit or left service due to security concerns; 20 pilots contemplating quitting ^{3,4,5,6}
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

IMPLICATIONS OF ANDSF COLLAPSE ON AFGHAN STABILITY

- Largely uncontested Taliban assaults on major population centers (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)
- Increased hedging behavior from powerbrokers/militias to defend parochial interests (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)
- Public confidence, support for Kabul declines (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)
- **MDCOA:** Multi-polar ethno-sectarian civil war. Violence and instability threaten remaining U.S. forces and interests, including CT objectives (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

ASSESSMENT

NDS – National Directorate for Security | CT – Counterterrorism | AAF – Afghan Air Force

Partially observed indicators likely reflects normal battlefield pressures and uncertainty associated with a stalled peace process and a planned Coalition withdrawal. ANDSF remain cohesive but final withdrawal announcement increases risk for destabilizing fracturing in the next 6 months. (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

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USCENTCOM FOIA 210517

000145 06/23/2023



AFGHANISTAN: Assessing Indicators of ANDSF Collapse (S//REL TO USA, RSMA)

Sources:

(b)(1)1.4c

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AFGHANISTAN: Daily Update ^(U)

J22 - Afghanistan

20 April 2021

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

WHAT TO WATCH FOR



INTERNAL AFGHAN STABILITY

- Observed
- ◐ Partially
- Not Observed

GIROA IS UNLIKELY TO COLLAPSE AND ANDSF WILL REMAIN COHESIVE WITH INTERNATIONAL FUNDING THROUGH SEPTEMBER ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

GIROA and powerbrokers jockeyed for influence prior to the U.S. announcement, while ANDSF retention challenges continue resulting in the following indicators: ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

- ◐ PoA removes leaders in the security pillars and replaces them with loyalists ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~
- ◐ Powerbrokers / opposition seek independent arrangements outside of GIROA ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~
- ◐ Reduction of donor funding ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~
- ◐ Desertions / defections ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

THREAT GROUPS/FORCE PROTECTION

NO LONGER CONFINED TO THE DOHA AGREEMENT, TALIBAN/HQN LIKELY WILL BALANCE ORDERING IMMEDIATE OPERATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL FAVOR ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~


Taliban press statement abdicated responsibility for what comes next in Afghanistan and continues to prepare to take power by force. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

- ◐ Increasingly aggressive rhetoric ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~
- ◐ Focus operations along GLOCs ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~
- ◐ Withdrawal from Afghan Peace Negotiations/other negotiations ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

EXTERNAL ACTOR INFLUENCE

INDIVIDUAL EXTERNAL ACTORS PREFER AFGHAN STABILITY, ALTHOUGH REMAIN RELUCTANT TO FILL A POTENTIAL SECURITY VACUUM ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

1.4d, 1.4c



(b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c

Locations of U.S. Personnel
— Ring Road



ASSESSMENT

Despite the recent U.S. announcement to depart Afghanistan, GIROA and powerbrokers' responses remain largely muted. The Taliban almost certainly can resume and sustain offensive operations against Coalition forces following 1 May and could escalate attacks with no warning. Most of the observable indicators reflect behaviors already underway and not a change to the overall threat to Afghan stability. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

ICOD: 20210418 | Classified by: (b)(6) | Derived from: Multiple Sources | Declassify on: 20310418

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~
000147 06/23/2023

AFGHANISTAN: Daily Update (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

Sources:

¹ (U) OSC;

(b)(3)50 USC 3024(i)

181627Z APR 21; (U) Afghanistan: If No US Policy Change, Taliban Will Not Attend Istanbul Summit; Overall classification U

² (U) OSC;

(b)(3)50 USC 3024(i)

181216Z APR 21; (U) Afghan Taliban team may visit Pakistan to discuss US pullout delay; Overall classification U

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AFGHANISTAN: Daily Update ^(U)

J22-Afghanistan | (b)(6)

27 APR 2021

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

WHAT TO WATCH FOR



INTERNAL AFGHAN STABILITY

- Observed
- ◐ Partially
- Not Observed

GIROA IS UNLIKELY TO COLLAPSE AND ANDSF WILL REMAIN COHESIVE WITH INTERNATIONAL FUNDING THROUGH SEPTEMBER ^(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

GIROA and powerbrokers jockeyed for influence prior to the U.S. announcement, while ANDSF retention challenges continue resulting in the following indicators:¹ ^(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- ◐ PoA removes leaders in the security pillars and replaces them with loyalists ² ^(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Powerbrokers/opposition seek independent arrangements outside of GIROA ³ ^(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Reduction of donor funding ⁴ ^(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Desertions/defections ⁵ ^(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

THREAT GROUPS/FORCE PROTECTION


NO LONGER CONFINED TO THE DOHA AGREEMENT, TALIBAN/HQN LIKELY WILL BALANCE ORDERING IMMEDIATE OPERATIONS AND ATTEMPTING TO RETAIN INTERNATIONAL FAVOR ^(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Taliban press statement abdicated responsibility for what comes next in Afghanistan and demonstrated continued intention to take power by force.⁶ ^(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- ◐ Increasingly aggressive rhetoric ⁷ ^(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Focus operations along GLOCs ⁸ ^(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Withdrawal from Afghan Peace negotiations/other negotiations ⁹ ^(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

EXTERNAL ACTOR INFLUENCE

INDIVIDUAL EXTERNAL ACTORS PREFER AFGHAN STABILITY; RELUCTANT TO FILL A POTENTIAL SECURITY VACUUM ^(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



^(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

 Locations of U.S. Personnel
 Ring Road



(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

Despite the recent U.S. announcement to depart Afghanistan, GIROA and powerbrokers' responses remain largely muted. The Taliban almost certainly can resume and sustain offensive operations against Coalition forces following 1 May and could escalate attacks with no warning. Most of the observable indicators reflect behaviors already underway and not a change to the overall threat to Afghan stability. ^(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

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(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)50USC3024(i)

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AFGHANISTAN: Daily Update (U)

J22-Afghanistan | (b)(6)

4 MAY 2021

WHAT TO WATCH FOR

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

INTERNAL AFGHAN STABILITY

- Observed
- ◐ Partially
- Not Observed

GIROA IS UNLIKELY TO COLLAPSE AND THE ANDSF WILL REMAIN COHESIVE WITH INTERNATIONAL FUNDING THROUGH SEP

GIROA and powerbrokers jockeyed for influence prior to the U.S. announcement while ANDSF retention challenges continue resulting in the following indicators:

- President of Afghanistan removes leaders in the security pillars and replaces them with loyalists²
- Powerbrokers/opposition seek independent arrangements outside of GIROA³
- Reduction of donor funding⁴
- Desertions/defections⁵
- Flight of leadership^{6,7}

THREAT GROUPS/FORCE PROTECTION


NO LONGER CONFINED TO THE DOHA AGREEMENT, TALIBAN/HQN LIKELY WILL BALANCE ORDERING IMMEDIATE OPERATIONS AND ATTEMPTING TO RETAIN INTERNATIONAL FAVOR

Taliban press statement abdicated responsibility for what comes next in Afghanistan and demonstrated continued intention to take power by force.

- Increasingly aggressive rhetoric⁹
- Focus operations along GLOCs¹⁰
- Withdrawal from Afghan Peace negotiations/other negotiations¹¹

EXTERNAL ACTOR INFLUENCE

INDIVIDUAL EXTERNAL ACTORS PREFER AFGHAN STABILITY; RELUCTANT TO FILL A POTENTIAL SECURITY VACUUM



(b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

Locations of U.S. Personnel

Ring Road



ASSESSMENT

Despite the recent U.S. announcement of its withdrawal from Afghanistan, GIROA and powerbrokers' responses remain largely muted. The Taliban almost certainly are positioned to resume and sustain offensive operations against Coalition forces and could escalate attacks with no warning. Most observable indicators by which we assess Afghanistan's stability reflect behaviors that were already underway prior to the U.S. announcement and do not indicate a change to the overall threat to Afghan stability.

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AFGHANISTAN: Indicators of Collapse - Flight of Leadership Overview (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

J22-Afghanistan | (b)(6)

4 MAY 2021



PREPARING FAMILIES

SENIOR SECURITY OFFICIALS PLANNING TO MOVE FAMILIES OUT OF AFGHANISTAN

Government and security officials planning for a potential degradation of the security environment. No indications at this time that key senior leaders have permanently left. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

APR: (b)(6) moved his family outside of Afghanistan.¹ (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

APR: (b)(6) applied for Indian visas for his family.² (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

(b)(1)1.4c



REPORTED DEPARTURES

SOME GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE DEPARTED OR ARE OUT OF COUNTRY

Current absences not affecting institutional performance; some still perform duties abroad as able. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Early JAN: Estimated 80-100 MPs (out of 316) were overseas, some returning only for important votes.⁵ (c)

JAN-APR: Embassies experienced increased volume of visa requests by Afghan officials and their families seeking to depart.^{3, 6} (S)

Late 2020: Small number of ministerial staff members have departed to other countries; unclear if they will return.⁷ (c)

(b)(1)1.4c

ASSESSMENT

SMW - Special Mission Wing | AAF - Afghan Air Force | NDS - National Directorate of Security | MP - Member of Parliament | CT - Counterterrorism

GIRoA's cohesion is fragile, but remains stable. Despite current levels of observed departures, GIRoA and ANDSF's ability to carry out governance and security functions is not threatened at this time. If current conditions continue over the next 90 days, government stability and leadership flight will not impact retrograde efforts. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

ICOD: 20210430 | Classified by: (b)(6) | USCENCOMP DIA 210817 | Derived from: Multiple Sources | Declassify on: 50X1-HUM

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AFGHANISTAN: Daily Update (U)

J22-Afghanistan | (b)(6)

10 MAY 2021

WHAT TO WATCH FOR

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY



INTERNAL AFGHAN STABILITY

- Observed
- ◐ Partially
- Not Observed

GIROA IS UNLIKELY TO COLLAPSE AND THE ANDSF WILL REMAIN COHESIVE WITH INTERNATIONAL FUNDING THROUGH SEP (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

GIROA and powerbrokers jockeyed for influence prior to the U.S. announcement, while ANDSF retention challenges continue resulting in the following indicators: (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- ◐ President of Afghanistan removes leaders in the security pillars and replaces them with loyalists² (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Powerbrokers/opposition seek independent arrangements outside of GIROA³ (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Reduction of donor funding⁴ (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Desertions/defections⁵ (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Flight of leadership⁶ (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

THREAT GROUPS/FORCE PROTECTION


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Taliban press statement abdicated responsibility for what comes next in Afghanistan and demonstrated continued intention to take power by force.⁷ (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- ◐ Increasingly aggressive rhetoric⁸ (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Focus operations along GLOCs⁹ (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Withdrawal from Afghan peace negotiations/other negotiations¹⁰ (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

EXTERNAL ACTOR INFLUENCE

INDIVIDUAL EXTERNAL ACTORS PREFER AFGHAN STABILITY; RELUCTANT TO FILL A POTENTIAL SECURITY VACUUM (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

ASSESSMENT

Despite the recent U.S. announcement to depart Afghanistan, GIROA and powerbrokers' responses remain largely muted. The Taliban almost certainly is positioned to resume and sustain offensive operations against Coalition Forces and could escalate attacks with no warning. Most of the observable indicators reflect behaviors already underway and not a change to the overall threat to Afghan stability. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



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Page 25 redacted for the following reason:

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Approved For Release



AFGHANISTAN: Daily Update (U)

J22-Afghanistan | (b)(6)

18 MAY 2021

WHAT TO WATCH FOR

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY



INTERNAL AFGHAN STABILITY

- Observed
- ◐ Partially
- Not Observed

GIROA IS UNLIKELY TO COLLAPSE AND THE ANDSF WILL REMAIN COHESIVE WITH INTERNATIONAL FUNDING THROUGH SEP (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

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THREAT GROUPS/FORCE PROTECTION


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- ◐ Increasingly aggressive rhetoric (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Focus operations along GLOCs (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Withdrawal from Afghan peace negotiations/other negotiations (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

EXTERNAL ACTOR INFLUENCE

INDIVIDUAL EXTERNAL ACTORS PREFER AFGHAN STABILITY; RELUCTANT TO FILL A POTENTIAL SECURITY VACUUM (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

ASSESSMENT

Despite the recent U.S. announcement to depart Afghanistan, GIROA and powerbrokers' responses remain largely muted. The Taliban almost certainly is positioned to resume and sustain offensive operations against Coalition forces and could escalate attacks with no warning. Most of the observable indicators reflect behaviors already underway and not a change to the overall threat to Afghan stability. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)





AFGHANISTAN: Daily Update (U)

J22-Afghanistan (b)(6)

23 MAY 2021

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

INTERNAL AFGHAN STABILITY

● Observed ◐ Partially ○ Not Observed

GIROA IS UNLIKELY TO COLLAPSE AND THE ANDSF WILL REMAIN COHESIVE WITH INTERNATIONAL FUNDING THROUGH SEP (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

GIROA and powerbrokers jockeyed for influence prior to the U.S. announcement, while ANDSF retention challenges continue resulting in the following indicators: (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- ◐ President of Afghanistan removes leaders in the security pillars and replaces them with loyalists (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Powerbrokers/opposition seek independent arrangements outside of GIROA (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Reduction of donor funding (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Desertions/defections (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Flight of leadership (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

THREAT GROUPS/FORCE PROTECTION


NO LONGER CONFINED TO THE DOHA AGREEMENT, TALIBAN/HQN LIKELY WILL BALANCE ORDERING IMMEDIATE OPERATIONS AND ATTEMPTING TO RETAIN INTERNATIONAL FAVOR (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Taliban press statement abdicated responsibility for what comes next in Afghanistan and demonstrated continued intention to take power by force. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- ◐ Increasingly aggressive rhetoric (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Focus operations along GLOCs (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Withdrawal from Afghan peace negotiations/other negotiations (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

EXTERNAL ACTOR INFLUENCE

INDIVIDUAL EXTERNAL ACTORS PREFER AFGHAN STABILITY; RELUCTANT TO FILL A POTENTIAL SECURITY VACUUM (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

WHAT TO WATCH FOR



PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT OF FARYAB GOVERNOR REMAINS CONTENTIOUS (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

21 MAY, Marshal Dostum continues protesting Ghani's unilateral selection of a new Faryab PGOV, which Dostum believes violates the 2020 political agreement between Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah. Dostum plans to provide continued support for ~3,000 Uzbek protestors blocking access to the PGOV's office. 1, 2 (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

OUTLOOK (U)

Ghani's ability to peacefully resolve the political impasse with Dostum will likely set precedence for future negotiations with other powerbrokers and influential elites. Ghani's current strategy may demonstrate limits to his authority; possible miscalculations risk undermining efforts to unify powerbrokers and GIROA as Taliban pressure increases. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

KEY DATES (U)



Mid-MAY: South/southwest poppy harvest (U)

21 JUN: Solstice (U)

20 JUL: Eid al-Qurban (U)

21-22 JUL: Eid al-Qurban Holiday (U)

ASSESSMENT

GIROA cohesion very likely does not pose a threat to Coalition Force retrograde, and powerbrokers almost certainly continue to view support for GIROA as the best course of action to secure their respective interests. ANDSF almost certainly continues to maintain the capability to conduct national-level defensive operations in prioritized areas. The Taliban almost certainly is positioned to resume operations against Coalition Forces and could escalate attacks with no warning, if withdrawal goals are not met. Most observable indicators reflect existing conditions and are not a change to the overall threat to Afghan stability. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Page 28 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(3)50USC3024(i), (b)(1)1.4c

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AFGHANISTAN: Indicators of Collapse - Powerbroker Outreach (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

J22-Afghanistan

27 MAY 2021

(b)(1)1.4c

Powerbrokers historically seek military and financial aid from foreign governments to secure personal and political interests.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4c

MAY: Atta Noor warned powerbrokers will seek regional assistance if the U.S. does not provide material support.² ~~(S//NF)~~

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

Regional nations likely attempting to maintain present relations with powerbrokers and hedge against uncertain GIRoA future.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

ASSESSMENT

Powerbrokers likely will pursue further external outreach to limit dependency on GIRoA and defend against Taliban encroachment into their spheres of influence. Powerbrokers likely will remain nominally aligned with GIRoA while the ANDSF is a viable fighting force and GIRoA serves as the primary conduit for international aid. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

Page 30 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4c

Approved For Release



AFGHANISTAN: Indicators of Collapse - Donor Funding Reduction (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

J22-Afghanistan

1 JUN 2021



U.S. DEPARTURE MAY UNDERCUT DONOR CONFIDENCE (U)

Concerns over systemic corruption and lack of direct oversight may reduce donor confidence and desire to fulfill pledges. ~~(S//NF)~~

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4b



REDUCED FUNDING INTENSIFIES UNDERLYING ISSUES (U)

Weak government institutions, insecurity, and tenuous political landscape likely to worsen without foreign aid. ~~(S//NF)~~

NOV 2020: After pledging \$12 billion over the next four years to support civil services, international donors were encouraged to conditionally pledge on a yearly basis, dependent on GIRoA improvement and peace progress.^{12,13} ~~(U//FOUO)~~

Lack of security, corruption, precarious infrastructure, and weak regulatory framework contribute to weak economic growth; likely to worsen if international aid continues to decrease.¹⁴ ~~(S//NF)~~

(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c



DONOR FUNDING VITAL FOR AFGHAN SECURITY (U)

(b)(1)1.4c

AUG 2020: Law and order trust fund for Afghanistan faced a roughly \$91 million shortfall with no firm donor commitments to fill pay gaps; likely to affect ANP reliability and negatively impact stability.^{8,9,10} ~~(S//NF)~~

(b)(1)1.4c

OCT 2020: Partner nations reaffirmed commitments to fund ANDSF through 2024; most only pledged specific amounts through 2021; ANA trust fund MOU expires DEC.¹¹ ~~(S//NF)~~

ASSESSMENT

Partially observed indicators likely reflect international donors' uncertainty for GIRoA/ANDSF viability in a post-Coalition environment. Absent international funding, ANDSF probably will consolidate security efforts to focus on GIRoA centers of gravity and reduce current force size and composition to prolong viability while attempting to maintain stability. ~~(S//NF)~~



AFGHANISTAN: Daily Update (U)

J22-Afghanistan | (b)(6)

3 JUN 2021

SECRET//HQS-P//ORCON-USGOV//NOFORN

WHAT TO WATCH FOR (U)



INTERNAL AFGHAN STABILITY (U)

- Observed
- ◐ Partially
- Not Observed

GIROA IS UNLIKELY TO COLLAPSE AND THE ANDSF WILL REMAIN COHESIVE WITH INTERNATIONAL FUNDING THROUGH SEPTEMBER (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

GIROA and powerbrokers jockeyed for influence prior to the U.S. announcement, while ANDSF retention challenges continue resulting in the following indicators: (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- ◐ President of Afghanistan removes leaders in the security pillars and replaces them with loyalists (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Powerbrokers/opposition seek independent arrangements outside of GIROA (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Reduction of donor funding (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Desertions/defections (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Flight of leadership (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

THREAT GROUPS/FORCE PROTECTION (U)


TALIBAN/HQN LIKELY WILL BALANCE MAINTAINING MILITARY PRESSURE ON GIROA AND ATTEMPTING TO RETAIN INTERNATIONAL FAVOR BY APPEARING COMMITTED TO THE PEACE PROCESS (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Taliban press statement abdicated responsibility for what comes next in Afghanistan and demonstrated continued intention to take power by force. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- ◐ Increasingly aggressive rhetoric (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Focus operations along GLOCs (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Withdrawal from Afghan peace negotiations/other negotiations (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

EXTERNAL ACTOR INFLUENCE (U)

INDIVIDUAL EXTERNAL ACTORS PREFER AFGHAN STABILITY; RELUCTANT TO FILL A POTENTIAL SECURITY VACUUM (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



- ◐ Transferred to Afghan Control/Closed
- ◐ Locations of U.S. Personnel
- Ring Road

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

ASSESSMENT

GIROA cohesion very likely does not pose a threat to Coalition force retrograde and powerbrokers almost certainly continue to view support for GIROA as the best course of action to secure their respective interests. ANDSF almost certainly continues to maintain the capability to conduct national-level defensive operations in prioritized areas. The Taliban almost certainly is positioned to resume operations against Coalition forces and could escalate attacks with no warning. Most observable indicators reflect existing conditions and are not a change to the overall threat to Afghan stability. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



Page 34 redacted for the following reason:

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AFGHANISTAN: Taliban Attempting to Isolate Kabul (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

J22-Afghanistan | (b)(6)

3 JUN 2021



(b)(1)1.4c

Taliban captured Dowlat Shah DC, increasing pressure in Alisheng and Alingar Districts. (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMIA)

21 MAY: Taliban seized Dowlat Shah DC. ^{1,2} (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMIA)

23-24 MAY: ANDSF abandoned 20 checkpoints in Alisheng and Alingar Districts. ³ (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMIA)



(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

11 MAY: Taliban seized Nerkh DC. ⁵ (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

(b)(1)1.4c




(b)(1)1.4c

Taliban likely intends to prevent ANDSF freedom of movement north of Kabul. (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMIA)

6 MAY: Taliban seized Burkha DC. ⁷ (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMIA)

4-9 MAY: Taliban overran all outposts along a 20-km stretch of Highway 3. ⁸ (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMIA)



AFGHANISTAN: TALIBAN EFFORTS TO ISOLATE KABUL
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

(b)(1)1.4c

Locally brokered surrenders and offers of amnesty almost certainly accelerating Taliban gains. (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMIA)

NOV 2020: A Taliban emir-endorsed amnesty letter was widely disseminated. ⁹ (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMIA)

The Taliban has been leveraging local tribal leaders to facilitate abandoning checkpoints across Afghanistan since at least late 2020. ¹⁰ (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMIA)



(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

25 MAY: ANDSF leadership reported Afghan Air Force and Coalition airstrikes halted the Taliban advance. ¹² (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



(b)(1)1.4c

Competing interests delayed 203rd Corps counterattack. (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMIA)

15 MAY: ANDSF assault elements staged 3 km northeast of Nerkh DC. ¹³ (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMIA)

18 MAY: Wardak Provincial Governor demanded reinforcements; as of 1 JUN, a counterattack is still delayed. ¹⁴ (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMIA)



(b)(1)1.4c

Taliban control Highway 3, blocking resupply to northern provinces. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Post-Eid clearing operations were unable to improve security. ^{15, 16} (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMIA)

25 MAY: Taliban seized checkpoints in Baghlan-e Jadid and cut off Highway 3 after Hezb-I Islami Gulbuddin militia withdraws. ¹⁷ (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMIA)

PC - Provincial Capital | DC - District Center

ASSESSMENT

Taliban commanders almost certainly will focus on pressuring ANDSF units around Kabul, which very likely will complicate ANDSF's capacity to reinforce and resupply units throughout Afghanistan. Taliban operations likely will not gain enough momentum to completely isolate Kabul prior to Coalition forces' retrograde. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Page 36 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)50USC3024(i)

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TERRORISM: AQ Remains Committed To Its Historic Base in Afghanistan (U)

J22 Trans-Regional Terrorism |

(b)(6)

4 JUN 2021

AQ TACTICALLY SUPPORTING TALIBAN

~~(S//NF)~~

AQ provides limited operational support to Taliban attacks, while maintaining a covert profile in Afghanistan. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

MID-JAN: Taliban Senior Shura agreed to allow collocated AQ militants to voluntarily conduct attacks alongside Taliban members¹. ~~(S//NF)~~

MID-APR: AQ trained suicide bombers in Pakistan for future Taliban operations². ~~(S//NF)~~

LATE APR: Senior AQ members met with Haqqani Network and Taliban leaders to offer to conduct offensive efforts with the Taliban in Afghanistan^{3,4}. ~~(S//NF)~~

(U) In 2001, former AQ emir Usama Bin Laden pledged bayat to the Taliban. Current AQ emir Ayman Zawahiri reaffirmed AQ's pledge in 2016. The groups have maintained a durable relationship based on their ideological overlap, lifelong friendships, and extensive intermarriages. Taliban leaders have protected AQ since the 1990s and remain unlikely to denounce or expel the terrorist group.⁹

COMMENCING RECONSTITUTION

~~(S//NF)~~

AQ likely to seek limited operational autonomy from the Taliban to begin rebuilding in the next 12-24 months. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

30 APR: In an interview with CNN, alleged AQIS operatives stated they will continue to support the Taliban and the war against the U.S. will continue on all fronts until they are expelled from the rest of the Islamic World⁵. ~~(U//FOUO)~~

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

In a JAN 2019 interview, the current AQIS emir stated the group's priority is to expand in South Asia, as it is AQIS' second target behind the U.S.⁸. ~~(U//FOUO)~~

Among our priorities, a big priority is to defend the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and strengthen it.

~ Usama Mahmoud
AQIS emir

ASSESSMENT

AQIS - al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent | ANDSF - Afghan National Defense and Security Forces | KAF - Kandahar AirField

AQ almost certainly will remain pragmatic as it navigates its re-emergence in Afghanistan, careful not to implicate Taliban provision of safe haven. In turn, the Taliban almost certainly will allow AQ to operate covertly in Afghanistan until Coalition forces depart before easing restrictions, which could eventually allow AQ to reevaluate using Afghanistan as a base to direct EXOPs. ~~(S//NF)~~



AFGHANISTAN: Daily Update (U)

J22-Afghan Threats |

7 JUN 2021

WHAT TO WATCH FOR (U)

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

INTERNAL AFGHAN STABILITY (U)

- Observed
- ◐ Partially
- Not Observed

GIRoA IS UNLIKELY TO COLLAPSE AND THE ANDSF WILL REMAIN COHESIVE WITH INTERNATIONAL FUNDING THROUGH SEP ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

GIRoA and powerbrokers continue to balance government cohesion with regional interests, while ANDSF retention challenges continue resulting in the following indicators: ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

- President of Afghanistan removes leaders in the security pillars and replaces them with loyalists ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~
- Powerbrokers/opposition seek independent arrangements outside of GIRoA ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~
- Reduction of donor funding ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~
- Desertions/defections ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~
- Flight of leadership ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

THREAT GROUPS/FORCE PROTECTION (U)


TALIBAN/HQN LIKELY WILL BALANCE MAINTAINING MILITARY PRESSURE ON GIRoA AND ATTEMPTING TO RETAIN INTERNATIONAL FAVOR BY APPEARING COMMITTED TO THE PEACE PROCESS ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

Taliban messaging continues to justify attacks against foreign forces and warn other countries against allowing attacks from their soil; attacks against GIRoA/ANDSF demonstrate continued intention to take power by force. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

- Increasingly aggressive rhetoric ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~
- Focus operations along GLOCs ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~
- Withdrawal from Afghan peace negotiations/other negotiations ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

EXTERNAL ACTOR INFLUENCE (U)

INDIVIDUAL EXTERNAL ACTORS PREFER AFGHAN STABILITY; RELUCTANT TO FILL A POTENTIAL SECURITY VACUUM ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~



(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

ASSESSMENT

GIRoA cohesion very likely does not pose a threat to Coalition retrograde and powerbrokers almost certainly view GIRoA as the best option to secure individual interests. ANDSF almost certainly continues to maintain the capability to conduct national-level defensive operations in prioritized areas. The Taliban almost certainly can resume operations against Coalition Forces and escalate attacks with no warning. Most observable indicators reflect existing conditions and are not a change to the overall threat to Afghan stability. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

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(b)(1)1.4c

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AFGHANISTAN: Indicators of Collapse – President Ghani Replacing Security Leaders

J22-Afghanistan | (b)(6)

11 JUN 2021

(b)(1)1.4c

Ghani is attempting to streamline C2 to gain battlefield awareness and direct operations at the cost of security forces' operational independence. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

MAY: Ghani replaced four of seven corps commanders, the Police Special Unit Commander, and Deputy Minister for Security since early MAY.^{1,2,3} ~~(S//NF)~~

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4c

Security leadership changes are causing disruption and discord among senior security leadership, potentially undermining cohesion of the force. ~~(S//NF)~~

Mid-MAY: ANASOC Commander (b)(6) frustrated with numerous unimportant requests from NSC and NSA Mohib for his time during high operational periods.⁵ ~~(S//NF)~~

Late MAY: AAF Commander (b)(6) angered by receiving operation orders from Ghani's inner circle and not through proper channels.⁶ ~~(S//NF)~~

(b)(1)1.4c

Late MAY: Senior military leaders lamented palace interference; cited NSC "Tactical Meetings" and a lack of buffer between themselves and policymakers.⁷ ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

ASSESSMENT

AAF – Afghanistan Air Force | ANASOC – ANA Special Operations Command | NSC – National Security Council | NSA – National Security Advisor

Ghani likely intends to emplace leaders he can directly influence and trust to implement his vision for security. These personnel changes are unlikely to impact the U.S. retrograde; Ghani's unilateral appointments risk exacerbating perceptions that he is consolidating power and excluding other stakeholders from key political and security decisions. ~~(S//NF)~~

Page 42 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4c

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AFGHANISTAN: Daily Update (U)

J22-Afghan Threats | (b)(6)

12 JUN 2021

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY//FISA

WHAT TO WATCH FOR (U)



INTERNAL AFGHAN STABILITY (U)

- Observed
- ◐ Partially
- Not Observed

GIROA IS UNLIKELY TO COLLAPSE AND THE ANDSF WILL REMAIN COHESIVE WITH INTERNATIONAL FUNDING THROUGH SEP (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

GIROA and powerbrokers continue to balance government cohesion with regional interests while ANDSF retention challenges continue resulting in the following indicators: (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- President of Afghanistan removes leaders in the security pillars and replaces them with loyalists (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Powerbrokers/opposition seek independent arrangements outside of GIROA (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
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- Desertions/defections (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Flight of leadership (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

THREAT GROUPS/FORCE PROTECTION (U)


TALIBAN/HQN LIKELY WILL BALANCE MAINTAINING MILITARY PRESSURE ON GIROA AND ATTEMPTING TO RETAIN INTERNATIONAL FAVOR BY APPEARING COMMITTED TO THE PEACE PROCESS (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Taliban messaging continues to justify attacks against foreign forces and warn other countries against allowing attacks from their soil; attacks against GIROA/ANDSF demonstrate continued intention to take power by force. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- Increasingly aggressive rhetoric (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Focus operations along GLOCs (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Withdrawal from Afghan peace negotiations/other negotiations (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

EXTERNAL ACTOR INFLUENCE (U)

INDIVIDUAL EXTERNAL ACTORS PREFER AFGHAN STABILITY; RELUCTANT TO FILL A POTENTIAL SECURITY VACUUM (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

ASSESSMENT

GIROA cohesion very likely does not pose a threat to Coalition retrograde and powerbrokers almost certainly view GIROA as the best option to secure individual interests. ANDSF almost certainly continues to maintain the capability to conduct national-level defensive operations in prioritized areas. The Taliban almost certainly can resume operations against Coalition forces and escalate attacks with no warning. Most observable indicators reflect existing conditions and are not a change to the overall threat to Afghan stability. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0547
ICOD: 20210611 | Classified by: (b)(6) | Derived from: Multiple Sources | Declassify on: 20400611

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000176 06/23/2023
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY//FISA



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AFGHANISTAN: Assessing Indicators of ANDSF Collapse (S//REL TO USA, RSMIA)

J22-Afghanistan

17 JUN 2021



OBSERVED INDICATORS

(U)

1 APR - 15 JUN (U)

(b)(1)1.4c

Afghanistan Special Security Forces refuse to reinforce Dowlatabad, Faryab causing retrograde from the district center. ³⁷ ~~(S//REL TO USA, RSMIA)~~

(b)(1)1.4c

ANA Corps refuse to conduct operations without SOF support. ³⁸, ³⁹ ~~(S//REL TO USA, RSMIA)~~

(b)(1)1.4c

Two Afghan Air Force pilots depart the country; two Afghan Air Force leaders arrange for family relocation. ⁴⁰, ⁴¹, ⁴² ~~(S//REL TO USA, RSMIA)~~



IMPLICATIONS OF ANDSF COLLAPSE ON AFGHAN STABILITY (S//NF)

Largely uncontested Taliban assaults on major population centers. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMIA)~~

Increased hedging behavior from powerbrokers/militias to defend parochial interests. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMIA)~~

Public confidence and support for Kabul declines. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMIA)~~

Most Dangerous Course of Action: Multi-polar ethno-sectarian civil war; violence and instability threaten remaining U.S. forces and interests, including CT objectives. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMIA)~~

ASSESSMENT

The Taliban's IO campaign, combined with the U.S./NATO withdrawal, likely is psychologically impairing ANDSF's will to fight at the lower ranks and is fueling desertions/defections. ANDSF's loss of territorial control in rural areas and manpower deterioration over the past 60 days increases risk of collapse within the next 6-12 months. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMIA)~~

USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0517
ICOD: 20210614 | Classified by: (b)(6) | Derived from: Multiple Sources | Declassify on: 50X1-HUM

000178 06/23/2023

Page 46 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)50USC3024(i)

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Page 48 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4c

Approved For Release



AFGHANISTAN: TBSL Decentralized Attack Authority Maximizing Gains (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

J22-Afghanistan Threats

21 June 2021

TOP SECRET//HCS-P//SI//ORCON-USOOV//NOFORN/FISA



TBSL DELEGATES MOST MILITARY DECISIONS TO MAXIMIZE VIOLENCE AND SEIZE TERRAIN (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)


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MAY - 13 JUN: The Taliban reportedly took control of 46 districts, including multiple districts adjacent to Kabul; ANDSF have retaken three. 5,6,7,8,9,10

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, ROMAN)

(b)(1)1.4c

TALIBAN SIGACTS SINCE MAY (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



Source: CENTCOM

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

ASSESSMENT

CF - Coalition Forces | HKIA - Hamid Karzai International Airport | TBSL - Taliban Senior Leadership | PC - Provincial Capital | TMC - Taliban Military Commission

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c Taliban operations and amnesty policy almost certainly will drive additional territorial gains and allow them to reequip fighters with seized assets, positioning them for larger operations to seize provincial capitals and possibly Kabul following the Coalition withdrawal.

ICOD: 20210614 | Classified by (b)(6) | Declassify on: 50X1-HUM

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Page 52 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

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AFGHANISTAN: Daily Update ^(U)

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Sources:

¹ (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Resolute Support; SAR Daily Rollup; 241700D JUN 21; (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA) Fallen District Center Tracker; Overall classification is S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA

Approved For Release



AFGHANISTAN: Indicators of Collapse – Loss of Public Confidence in GIROA (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

J22-Afghanistan |

(b)(6)

25 JUN 2021



POPULACE CRITICAL OF GIROA LEADERSHIP (S//NF)

Protests, minority calls for improved security, and tribal dissatisfaction aimed at Ghani-led GIROA almost certainly will continue. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- MAY-JUN: Multi-day protests in Faryab and Badakhshan involved violence; demanded changes to Provincial Governor appointments, security, and government services.^{1,2,3} (U)

➤

(b)(1)1.4c

(S//NF)

“...it is time to shut down the failed Ghani administration.”

~ Gul Agha Sherzai

Leader of the Barakzai Pashtun tribe

“The government should not test the people's patience. There's a possibility that our people will make attempts on their own to ensure their safety.”

~ Hazara MP from Kabul

“I support the message of Mr. Atta Mohammad Noor, who called for unity between themselves and Marshal Dostum and me, within the framework of the Islamic Republic.”

~ Mohammad Mohaqqueq

Leader of the People's Islamic Unity Party



...LIKELY WANT NON-TALIBAN GOVERNANCE (S//NF)

A unified republic, even via non-constitutional means or with negotiated concessions (arms, funding), very likely provides Afghans the best opportunity to confront the Taliban and secure international financial support. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- 15 JUN: Mohaqqueq supported unity with Atta Noor and Dostum, within the framework of the Islamic Republic.^{5,6} (S//NF)
- 13 JUN: Khallili said Hazaras seek cooperation from the National Security Council, international allies, and the government.⁷ (U)

➤

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

ASSESSMENT

The populace almost certainly will continue to criticize the rapid deterioration of security, GIROA's control of local institutions, and Ghani's war strategy. Degraded security and continued uncertainty over long-term international support almost certainly will continue to erode public confidence in GIROA, set conditions for an extra-constitutional transition of government, and possibly increase the risk of instability and civil disorder.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

ICOD: 20210625 CLASSIFIED BY: [redacted] (b)(6)

Derived from: Multiple Sources | Declassify on: 50X1-HUM

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Page 57 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1), 4c, (b)(6)

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Page 58 redacted for the following reason:

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AFGHANISTAN: Indicators of Collapse: Local ANDSF/Taliban Collusion ~~(S//NF)~~

J22-Afghanistan|

(b)(6)

1 JUL 2021



ANDSF/TALIBAN LIKELY COLLUDING ~~(S//NF)~~

ANDSF local commanders negotiating with the Taliban at the tactical level to protect personnel and secure safe passage from contested areas, handing over military bases, CPs, and equipment. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

Late JUN: ANA base commander surrendered a base in Jowzjan following secret negotiations with the Taliban.¹

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4c



LOCAL COMMANDERS LIKELY FEELING PRESSURED ~~(S//NF)~~

Mounting pressure due to leadership failures, morale, and resupply issues likely is contributing to ANDSF local commanders negotiating directly with the Taliban. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4c

Senior ANA official claimed provincial-level government officials are encouraging defections/surrenders; likely officials who oppose President Ghani. ⁸ ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

ANDSF failure to resupply troops likely leaves local commanders with limited options other than surrendering/abandoning posts. ⁹ ~~(U)~~

CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING ANDSF/TALIBAN COLLUSION ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4c

COLLUSION INDICATOR DEFINITION: This indicator monitors ANDSF tactical/operational leadership coordinating with the Taliban to negotiate surrenders, handing over military facilities and equipment or shifting support away from GIROA, enabling Taliban goals, and/or assisting Taliban military campaign. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

ASSESSMENT

CP - Checkpoints

Battlefield conditions likely are driving the collusion at the tactical level. No evidence brigade level or higher ANDSF leaders are colluding with the Taliban against GIROA or that there is a broad-based shift in ANDSF leaders' loyalty to GIROA. (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

~~(S//NF)~~

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AFGHANISTAN: Daily Update (U)

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

J22-Afghanistan | (b)(6)

2 JUL 2021

INTERNAL AFGHAN STABILITY (U) ● Observed ◐ Partially ○ Not Observed

GIROA IS UNLIKELY TO COLLAPSE AND THE ANDSF LIKELY WILL REMAIN COHESIVE WITH INTERNATIONAL FUNDING THROUGH SEP (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Rapid Taliban battlefield gains are shaping powerbrokers' and GIROA leaders' hedging behavior undermining government cohesion and exacerbating ANDSF retention challenges resulting in the following indicators: (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- President of Afghanistan removes leaders in the security pillars and replaces them with loyalists (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Powerbrokers/opposition seek independent arrangements outside of GIROA (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Growth in internally displaced persons/refugee migration (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Desertions/defections (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Flight of leadership (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ ANDSF refusal of orders (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

THREAT GROUPS/ FORCE PROTECTION (U)


TALIBAN/HQN LIKELY WILL MAINTAIN MILITARY PRESSURE ON GIROA AND PRIORITIZE ENGAGING POWERBROKERS AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS IN PURSUIT OF GIROA SURRENDER (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Taliban messaging continues to justify attacks against foreign forces and warn other countries against allowing attacks from their soil; attacks against GIROA/ANDSF demonstrate continued intention to take power by force if necessary. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- ◐ Increasingly aggressive rhetoric (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Focus operations along GLOCs (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Withdrawal from Afghan peace negotiations/other negotiations (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

EXTERNAL ACTOR INFLUENCE (U)

INDIVIDUAL EXTERNAL ACTORS PREFER AFGHAN STABILITY; RELUCTANT TO FILL A POTENTIAL SECURITY VACUUM (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



WHAT TO WATCH FOR

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

Fallen District Centers (U)

Note: This product only addresses District Center control, not overall district control. There may be some districts where the Taliban effectively maintain control, yet GIROA/ANDSF still hold the District Center.

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4c

ASSESSMENT

GIROA cohesion very likely does not pose a threat to Coalition retrograde. Powerbrokers remain nominally aligned with GIROA, but likely are beginning to question whether GIROA is the best option to secure individual interests. ANDSF likely maintains the capability to conduct national-level defensive operations in prioritized areas, but capacity is declining. The Taliban almost certainly can resume operations against Coalition Forces and escalate attacks with no warning. Most observable indicators reflect existing conditions and are not a change to the overall threat to Afghan stability. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Page 62 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

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AFGHANISTAN: Daily Update ^(U)

Sources:

¹ (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Resolute Support; SAR Daily Rollup; 011800D JUL 21; (~~S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA~~) Fallen District Center Tracker; Overall classification is ~~S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA~~

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AFGHANISTAN: Daily Update (U)

J22-Afghanistan | (b)(6)

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

14 JUL 2021

INTERNAL AFGHAN STABILITY (U)

● Observed ○ Partially ○ Not Observed

RISK OF GIROA COLLAPSE INCREASES FOLLOWING AUG WITHDRAWAL DEADLINE, ANDSF LIKELY WILL REMAIN COHESIVE WITH INTERNATIONAL FUNDING THROUGH SEP (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Rapid Taliban battlefield gains are shaping powerbrokers' and GiRoA leaders' hedging behavior, undermining government cohesion and exacerbating ANDSF retention challenges, resulting in the following indicators: (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- President of Afghanistan removes leaders in the security pillars and replaces them with loyalists (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Powerbrokers/opposition seek independent arrangements outside of GiRoA (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Growth in internally displaced persons/refugee migration (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Desertions/defections (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Flight of leadership (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ANDSF refusal of orders (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

THREAT GROUPS/FORCE PROTECTION (U)

TALIBAN/HQN LIKELY WILL MAINTAIN MILITARY PRESSURE ON GIROA AND PRIORITIZE ENGAGING POWERBROKERS AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS IN PURSUIT OF GIROA SURRENDER (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)


Taliban messaging continues to justify attacks against remaining foreign forces and warn other countries against allowing attacks from their soil; attacks against GiRoA demonstrate continued intent to take power by force if necessary. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- Increasingly aggressive rhetoric (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Focus operations along GLOCs (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Withdrawal from Afghan peace negotiations/other negotiations (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

EXTERNAL ACTOR INFLUENCE (U)

INDIVIDUAL EXTERNAL ACTORS PREFER AFGHAN STABILITY; RELUCTANT TO FILL A POTENTIAL SECURITY VACUUM (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d



Note: This product only addresses District Center control, not overall district control. There may be some districts where the Taliban effectively maintain control, yet GiRoA/ANDSF still hold the District Center.

(b)(1)1.4c

WHAT TO WATCH FOR (U)



TARGETED KILLINGS CONTINUE IN KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

On 13 JUL, three Office of Prisons Administration (OPA) employees were shot and killed in Kabul on their way to work; this follows an 11 JUL attack killing two other OPA employees on their way to Pul-e Charki Prison. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

OUTLOOK (U)

No group has claimed responsibility for the attacks, though the Taliban have routinely targeted Afghan law enforcement personnel and other public servants; attacks likely serve to weaken GiRoA institutions and instill fear in personnel maintaining prisons holding Taliban prisoners. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Fallen District Centers (U)

Since Last Update on 13 JUL:

#	District, Province	Date
189	Kahmard, Bamyan	12 JUL
190	Sayghan, Bamyan	12 JUL
191	Arghandab, Kandahar	12 JUL
192	Malistan, Ghazni	12 JUL
193	Chahar Sadah, Ghor	13 JUL
194	Pur Chaman, Farah	13 JUL
195	Musa Khel, Khost	13 JUL
196	Alingar, Laghman	13 JUL

- 213 total district centers held by the Taliban
- 196 seized by the Taliban since 6 MAY
- 18 of the seized district centers retaken by ANDSF

Tracker ICD: 17000 13 JUL

ASSESSMENT

GIROA remains functional, but very likely is susceptible to cascading events which could trigger a collapse in authority and civil order with little to no warning. Powerbrokers remain nominally aligned with GiRoA, but almost certainly are questioning whether GiRoA is the best option to secure individual interests. ANDSF probably maintains the capability to conduct national-level defensive operations in prioritized areas, but capacity and morale are declining and limiting overall effectiveness. The Taliban almost certainly can resume operations against remaining Coalition forces and diplomatic personnel and escalate attacks with no warning. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

ICOD: USCENTCOM/AFSA/210915 (b)(6) | Derived from: Multiple Sources | Declassify on: 20510712

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AFGHANISTAN: Daily Update (U)

J22-Afghanistan | (b)(6)

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

20 JUL 2021

INTERNAL AFGHAN STABILITY (U)

● Observed ◐ Partially ○ Not Observed

RISK OF GIROA COLLAPSE INCREASES FOLLOWING AUG WITHDRAWAL DEADLINE, ANDSF LIKELY WILL REMAIN COHESIVE WITH INTERNATIONAL FUNDING THROUGH SEP (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

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- ◐ Growth in internally displaced persons/refugee migration (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Desertions/defections (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Flight of leadership (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ ANDSF refusal of orders (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

THREAT GROUPS/ FORCE PROTECTION (U)


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Taliban messaging continues to justify attacks against remaining foreign forces and warn other countries against allowing attacks from their soil; attacks against GIROA demonstrate continued intent to take power by force if necessary. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- ◐ Increasingly aggressive rhetoric (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Focus operations along GLOCs (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Withdrawal from Afghan peace negotiations/other negotiations (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

EXTERNAL ACTOR INFLUENCE (U)

INDIVIDUAL EXTERNAL ACTORS PREFER AFGHAN STABILITY; RELUCTANT TO FILL A POTENTIAL SECURITY VACUUM (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



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(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

WHAT TO WATCH FOR (U)



TB-GIROA AGREE TO SPEED UP NEGOTIATIONS (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

According to 19 JUL OSINT, GIROA and Taliban Political Commission (TPC) members in Doha agreed on the need to "speed up" negotiations to reach a just and lasting political solution following the close of recent diplomatic engagements; Taliban spokesman Mohammed Naem further emphasized the Taliban "categorically rejected any agreement on a ceasefire or release of prisoners." (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

OUTLOOK (U)

Although TPC and GIROA members agreed to accelerate negotiations to reach a peaceful agreement through diplomatic engagement, political progress is unlikely given the Taliban's military advantage and international support to GIROA; both sides are likely unwilling to provide additional concessions, in anticipation of future political wrangling. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Fallen District Centers (U)

Since Last Update on 19 JUL:

#	District, Province	Date
203	Qesh Qash, Uruzgan	19 JUL
202	Barda, Nangarhar	19 JUL

- 203 total district centers held by the Taliban
- 197 seized by the Taliban since 6 MAY
- 26 of the seized district centers retaken by ANDSF

Tracker/ICOD: 19000 17 JUL

ASSESSMENT

GIROA remains functional, but very likely is susceptible to cascading events which could trigger a collapse in authority and civil order with little to no warning. Powerbrokers remain nominally aligned with GIROA, but almost certainly are questioning whether GIROA is the best option to secure individual interests. ANDSF likely maintains the capability to conduct national-level defensive operations in prioritized areas, but capacity and morale are declining, limiting overall effectiveness. The Taliban almost certainly can resume operations against remaining Coalition forces and diplomatic personnel, and escalate attacks with no warning. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

ICOD: 19000 17 JUL 2021 (b)(6) | Derived from: Multiple Sources | Declassify on: 20910721

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AFGHANISTAN: Confidence Shaken by Pressure Across the "DIME" Spectrum

J22-Afghanistan

(b)(6)

26 JUL 2021

DIPLOMATIC

INFORMATION

MILITARY

ECONOMIC

The Taliban is becoming more demanding in talks; states are hedging on whether GIROA will survive.

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4c

The Taliban's IO is exacerbating low morale, which is contributing to cascading battlefield setbacks and amplifying negative regional optics.

Taliban IO is further demoralizing ANDSF beyond battlefield losses, fueling public perceptions of U.S. abandonment.

(b)(1)1.4c

Mid-JUL: The Taliban released a message calling for provincial capitals to surrender without a fight to avoid chaos and loss of life in order to preserve cities as they are assets of Afghanistan's future.

(b)(1)1.4c

The Taliban made gains in multiple provinces as GIROA security leaders scramble to develop a strategic plan to halt Taliban momentum.

JUL: The Taliban control more than half of Afghan districts; isolated numerous provincial capitals.

Mid-JUL: Senior ANSDF officials are unable to develop a unified plan to counter Taliban pressure, consolidate forces, and prioritize protection of key provincial capitals; U.S. and Coalition mentoring required to help develop cohesive strategy.

Afghans are concerned about loss of customs revenue after the Taliban seized border crossings; food and fuel shortages growing in areas where the Taliban controls GLOCs.

Seizure of border crossings and GLOCs allows the Taliban to control/tax imports; flow of commerce into cities.


Taliban's control of key roads around the country is disrupting ANDSF logistics/resupply efforts; some provincial capitals isolated from Kabul.

Early JUL: President Ghani posited goal of the Taliban's northern offensive was to cut off Afghanistan economically from Central Asia.

WHAT GIROA LIKELY WANTS:

- > International condemnation of Taliban violence.
- > Security assistance support to ANDSF and Afghan Security Forces Fund.
- > GIROA visit to Europe or NATO, similar to recent White House visit, to demonstrate confidence in GIROA.
- > Kinetic strikes in defense of Kabul or in response to Taliban encroachment on Kabul (that could put diplomatic presence at risk).
- > Increased kinetic strikes on the Taliban.
- > Assurances on food and fuel to avert potential humanitarian crisis.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



GIROA'S POSSIBLE OPTIONS:

- > Contrast GIROA's history as a reliable partner on donor nation's core interests in Afghanistan with the Taliban's lack of assurances on those same concern.
- > Increase messaging on GIROA's collaborative success improving Afghanistan's national infrastructure and providing public services.
- > Prioritize defense of provincial capitals, particularly those that border Kabul.
- > Prioritize defending/retaking key terrain, GLOCs, and Taliban staging areas adjacent to Kabul.
- > Press national level quasi-legal bodies to resolve core issues and forge political unity.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

ASSESSMENT

GIROA almost certainly will need continued international support across the DIME spectrum to retain domestic and international legitimacy and weather Taliban pressure. Economic pressure, particularly in the food and fuel sectors, likely presents the greatest risk to overall GIROA viability as food and fuel shortages increase the likelihood of a humanitarian crisis.

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AFGHANISTAN: Daily Update (U)

J22-Afghanistan | (b)(6)

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

28 JUL 2021

INTERNAL AFGHAN STABILITY (U) ● Observed ◐ Partially ○ Not Observed

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- Desertions/defections (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Flight of leadership (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ ANDSF refusal of orders (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

THREAT GROUPS/FORCE PROTECTION (U)


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Taliban messaging continues to justify attacks against remaining foreign forces and warn other countries against allowing attacks from their soil; attacks against GIROA demonstrate continued intent to take power by force if necessary. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- ◐ Increasingly aggressive rhetoric (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Focus operations along GLOCs (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◐ Withdrawal from Afghan peace negotiations/other negotiations (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

EXTERNAL ACTOR INFLUENCE (U)

INDIVIDUAL EXTERNAL ACTORS PREFER AFGHAN STABILITY; RELUCTANT TO FILL A POTENTIAL SECURITY VACUUM (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



Note: This product only addresses district center control, not overall district control. There may be some districts where the Taliban effectively maintain control, yet GIROA/ANDSF still hold the district center.

WHAT TO WATCH FOR (U)

(b)(1)1.4c

Fallen District Centers (U)

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

ASSESSMENT

GIROA remains functional, but very likely is susceptible to cascading events which could trigger a collapse in authority and civil order with little to no warning. Powerbrokers remain nominally aligned with GIROA, but almost certainly are questioning whether GIROA is the best option to secure individual interests. ANDSF likely maintains the capability to conduct national-level defensive operations in prioritized areas, but capacity and morale are declining, limiting overall effectiveness. The Taliban almost certainly can resume operations against remaining Coalition Forces and diplomatic personnel, and escalate attacks with no warning. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



AFGHANISTAN: Indicators of Collapse – Powerbrokers Undermine GIROA Update

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

J22-Afghanistan

30 JUL 2021



ENSURING INFLUENCE IN STRONGHOLDS

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Powerbrokers calibrated efforts and minimal resources to protect ethnic bloc from advancing Taliban forces.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

(b)(1)1.4c

Aligned Powerbrokers (U)


Key Afghan Powerbrokers (U)



Abdul Rashid Dostum (Uzbek)



Mohammad Mohaqqueq (Hazara)



Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (Pashtun)



Mohammad Atta Noor (Tajik)



Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Pashtun)



Ahmad Massoud (Tajik)



Ismail Khan (Tajik)

This is an update to our previous assessment in Powerbrokers Undermine GIROA published on 15 MAY. Indicator changed from **Moderate** to **Not Observed**. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



POWERBROKERS FRUSTRATED WITH GIROA

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Powerbrokers requested resources from GIROA and received little to no assistance; struggling to maintain fighting force.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

ASSESSMENT

(b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4c

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AFGHANISTAN: Indicators of Collapse – Powerbroker Outreach (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

J22-Afghanistan |

(b)(6)

13 August 2021

GIRoA Sends Mixed Signals to Powerbrokers (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Powerbrokers losing confidence in GIRoA's ability to support their powerbase likely to drive them to deals outside GIRoA.
~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

10 AUG: Ghani meets with northern powerbrokers to discuss security situation and improve GIRoA/Powerbroker coordination.¹ (U)

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

ASSESSMENT

Powerbrokers likely assess the current trend in Taliban victories and minimal support from the government threaten their power bases and likely are more susceptible to external influencers. Powerbrokers likely have little capacity to change the current security environment without substantial external support; flight or alignment with Taliban would expedite potential GIRoA collapse. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

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AFGHANISTAN: Daily Update ^(U)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

ANALYTIC TRADECRAFT SUMMARY ^(U)

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Coordinated with: AFC-Q (formerly CJIOC-A), USFORA FWD

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


AFGHANISTAN: Daily Update (U)

J22-Afghanistan | (b)(6)

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

24 August 2021



WHAT TO WATCH FOR

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
Last Image: 20 August 2021

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ASSESSMENT

ISIS-K remains the most dangerous and likely threat to forces and civilians at HKIA. While the Taliban has expressed no intent to attack Coalition Forces during the withdrawal, Taliban senior leadership's patience and willingness to cooperate almost certainly will end after 31 August. Afghans reaching HKIA likely will continue decreasing as the Taliban increases security on major routes and restricts those without foreign visas. Desperation likely will increase as 31 August approaches, eclipsing the ability of some Taliban checkpoints to control the flow of civilians attempting to reach HKIA, almost certainly increasing the risk to the final stages of evacuation and retrograde operations. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

ICOD: 20190322 b1, c1, d1, e1, f1, g1, h1, i1, j1, k1, l1, m1, n1, o1, p1, q1, r1, s1, t1, u1, v1, w1, x1, y1, z1
Derived from: Multiple Sources | Declassify on: 20401231

HKIA - Hamid Karzai International Airport | USEK - U.S. Embassy Kabul

000214 SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

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AFGHANISTAN: ANDSF Combat Capacity Likely Declining (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RCMA)

J22-Afghanistan |

(b)(6)

22 FEB 2021



ANDSF CAPACITY TIED TO INTERNATIONAL ENABLERS (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RCMA)

Multiple Periods of Evolution...


- Nascent ANDSF: Unable to fill security void; insurgent reemergence ^{1,5} (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RCMA)
- Coalition Surge: ANDSF developed reliance on enablers ^{1,3} (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RCMA)
- Coalition Handoff: Defensive posture developed ^{12,13} (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RCMA)
- Re-posturing: Systemic shortfalls threaten viability ^{6,7} (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- * Coalition Withdrawal: US/TB agreement reduces US airstrikes, advisory touchpoints ^{11,14} (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

... Affected Force's Ability to Mature (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- Operations heavily Coalition reliant ¹ (U)
- "Ghost Soldiers", attrition deflating force strength ^{2,8} (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RCMA)
- Corruption, patronage politics an added complexity ^{4,8} (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RCMA)
- * Coalition drawdown, peace negotiations, political landscape increasing levels of uncertainty ^{9,10} (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



FACTORS WHICH SHAPED ANDSF EVOLUTION (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



ASSESSMENT

ANDSF combat capacity is likely declining due to the International footprint reduction and perceptions of the political landscape. This is a change to our 2018 assessment that ANDSF development plateaued based on consistent levels of international support. Reduced capacity risks ANDSF's ability to perform modern security functions, threatening its capability to retain control of key population centers in 2021. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

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AFGHANISTAN: 2021 OUTLOOK (U)

J22-Afghanistan

16 MAR 2021

2020 OVERVIEW (U)

2021 OUTLOOK (U)

Continued US Presence

Impact if US Withdraws

GOVERNANCE (U)

17 MAY 2020: Ghani and Abdullah reached political agreement to settle contested 2019 election; both control half of Cabinet appointments and Abdullah became head of new HCNR ¹ (U)

World Bank predicted Afghanistan GDP likely to contract 5.5 percent to 7.4 percent in 2020, primarily due to COVID-19 impacts ² (U)

24 NOV 2020: Donors conference reduced Afghanistan civilian aid to \$12 billion over four years, down from \$15.2 billion pledged in 2016, citing Afghanistan's uncertain future ³ (U)

Ghani likely will attempt to further centralize the government and diminish powerbroker influence ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

Ghani almost certainly will suppress calls to form interim government, removing GIROA officials who express support for such calls (U)

Afghan economy likely to shrink due to reduced donor investments and COVID impacts potentially threatening food security (U)

Powerbrokers likely will align with Ghani to maximize resources and hedge against potential Taliban return to power ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

Further reductions in international funding would inhibit GIROA's ability to meet current budgetary requirements / obligations ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

GIROA will increase diplomatic outreach to international and regional powers to offset financial and security shortfalls ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS (U)

29 FEB 2020: US-Taliban peace agreement signed ⁴ (U)

GIROA released over 5,000 Taliban prisoners to fulfill steps needed to begin negotiations with the Taliban ⁵ (U)

Early DEC 2020: Adopted Code of Conduct allowing discussions to progress on reduction-in-violence and future government structure supporting Taliban integration⁷ (U)

Pace of negotiations likely will remain slow; unlikely to produce a settlement in 2021 ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

GIROA committed to Afghanistan Peace Negotiations as it offers the best chance at ensuring future aid ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

Taliban may abandon talks if leaders conclude participation will not secure US withdrawal ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

Potential for ethnic division and militia mobilization to protect and advance parochial interests, even at the expense of GIROA control ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

Political elites and powerbrokers may negotiate individual peace deals with the Taliban to protect personal interests ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

Increased regional pressure to reach a settlement that ensures internal stability ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

SECURITY (U)

Ghani issued Joint Order 125; protects population centers while projecting willingness to negotiate with the Taliban ⁸ ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

Defense activities focused on small-scale operations and interdiction ⁹ ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

ANDSF SOF and aviation assets were overtasked; stressed logistics structure ¹⁰ ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

Aviation support for sustainment and combat operations, intelligence, force generation will remain systemic challenges ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

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ANDSF conducting preemptive operations to counter anticipated insurgent violence increases ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

Leaders likely would question US commitments under the Bilateral Security Agreement, leading to a further reduction in confidence ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

Likely increase in potentially destabilizing hedging behavior by ANDSF members ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

US withdrawal absent a reduction in violence between GIROA and the Taliban would exacerbate abandonment fears and intensify reactions ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

HCNR - High Council of National Reconciliation

ASSESSMENT

Uncertainty around negotiations, a potential US drawdown, donor commitments, and the future of the Afghan government likely will degrade public confidence in the stability of the Afghan state. The impact on ANDSF morale and retention probably will negatively impact force capability to improve the security situation, further complicating GIROA efforts to negotiate from a position of strength.

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AFGHANISTAN: Taliban Gaining Tribal Support for Kandahar Offensive (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

J22-Trans-Regional Human Terrain | (b)(6)

28 APR 2021



TALIBAN POPULAR SUPPORT LIKELY GROWING

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~

Some tribal leaders are facilitating agreements to support the Taliban offensive in districts surrounding Kandahar City. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~

DEC 2020: Alikozai tribesmen bolstered Taliban in Arghandab and Panjwai Districts; some locals guided Taliban logistics through Kandahar.^{5,6} ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~

DEC 2020: Tribal leaders in Arghandab and Daman pledged to build support for a Taliban offensive; directed by the Taliban to message the population.⁷ ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~

JAN - FEB: Noorzai tribesmen aligned with the Taliban because of perceived harsh ANDSF treatment of Noorzai prisoners and a lack of government representation; elders feared Achekzai-Noorzai tensions enabled Taliban recruitment.^{12,13} ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~



TALIBAN OUTREACH INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE


~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~

Tribesmen aligning with the Taliban likely expect preferential treatment from the group post Coalition withdrawal. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~

OCT - NOV 2020: The population took queues from Alikozai tribal elders to support the Taliban; feeling more secure with Taliban in the area; ^{10, 11} tribesmen assisted the Taliban hoping to become future Arghandab elders.⁹ ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~

DEC 2020: The Taliban assigned additional commanders with Alikozai tribal ties to Arghandab to ensure the population's cooperation.⁸ ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~

NOV 2020 - FEB: Kandahar residents believed the Taliban will gain majority control in 2021; ANDSF reported decreased cooperation from population.^{1,2,3,4} ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~



ASSESSMENT

Additional tribal leaders in districts surrounding Kandahar City likely will pragmatically increase support to the Taliban and decrease cooperation with the ANDSF over the next six months. The Taliban likely will seek to integrate influential tribesmen into the group and exacerbate tribal tensions to maintain influence over vulnerable populations while preparing for a Coalition Force withdrawal. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~



AFGHANISTAN: Indicators of Collapse - Desertions/Defections Overview (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

J22-Afghanistan

(b)(6)

18 MAY 2021

CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING DESERTIONS/DEFECTIONS (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Not Observed	Retention and recruitment is able to keep pace with personnel loss associated with desertions/defections. Desertion/defections do not threaten force viability.
Partially Observed	Desertions/defections adding up to four Tolays (approximately 500) of personnel across the country within the past 60 days. A kandak (battalion) or higher deserts or defects in a single brigade.
Fully Observed	Desertions/defections adding up to four kandaks (approximately 2,600) of personnel across the country within 60 days. A brigade or higher deserts or defects in a single corps.

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Factors driving desertions/defections are poor leadership, lack of pay, deteriorating morale due to the Coalition withdrawal, inadequate combat support, service support, threats to family, and battlefield pressure. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

APR: ANP members in Kandahar left checkpoints and quit after the removal of police leadership, leaving ANA without assistance to operations. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

APR: Afghan Air Force pilot left Afghanistan after receiving threats from the Taliban. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

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
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The Taliban's aggressive information campaign is effective at compelling ANDSF surrenders/defections. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

(b)(1)1.4c

Since JAN, incidents of defections/desertions in the 207th and 209th have outpaced other corps. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

AS OF 7 MAY, NO CHANGE IN THE LAST 30 DAYS (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



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ASSESSMENT

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AFGHANISTAN: GIROA Likely Faces Challenges Post U.S. Withdrawal (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

J22-Afghanistan

8 JUN 2021



POLITICAL UNITY REMAINS

GIROA'S MAIN CHALLENGE

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

President Ghani is trying to unify elites and powerbrokers under GIROA; personal agendas and a lack of trust undermine his effort. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

Dostum challenged Ghani's authority when he incited protesting of government-appointed Governor in Faryab. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4c

Political elites remain skeptical; Ghani failed to follow through on past promises and concessions. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~



SECURITY ATMOSPHERICS

UNCERTAIN POST U.S. WITHDRAWAL

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

Afghan elites and international donors question ANDSF's post-Coalition viability. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

ANDSF lacks the capacity to assume control over Coalition contracts; potentially deteriorating resources and capability over time. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

Afghan civil society expressed concern ANDSF could disregard human rights and become less discriminatory in its tactics. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

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POTENTIAL PATHWAY FOR

FUTURE PEACE TALKS (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Possible indicators of reengagement toward peace talks between GIROA and the Taliban (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

Creation of back channel communications between GIROA and the Taliban; establishment of tangible development before publicly announcing progress. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

Pakistan arresting/limiting Taliban freedom of movement, potentially pressuring the Taliban to negotiations. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

ANDSF halts and/or reverses Taliban military advances. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

Taliban agree to a series of cease-fires with beginning and end dates instead of one cease-fire to end all fighting. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4c

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ASSESSMENT

A lack of unity among political elites and ANDSF's perceived weakness following the Coalition's withdrawal almost certainly will encourage continued Taliban military pressure and limit GIROA's ability to negotiate from a position of strength in the near term. GIROA and the Taliban are unlikely to make additional political concessions and earnestly reengage in the peace process until a military stalemate is established. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0517

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000226 06/23/2023



AFGHANISTAN: Taliban Emphasizing GLOC Control to Isolate Kabul (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

J22-Afghanistan Threats | (b)(6)

9 JUN 2021



TALIBAN MANEUVERING TO ISOLATE KABUL


~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~

Taliban commanders continue to pressure ANDSF units around Kabul, likely positioning for post-retrograde environment. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~

MAY: Taliban captured more than four district centers in the greater Kabul area, preventing ground resupply and support to northern and southern provinces. ^{1,2,3,4,6} ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~

Taliban have not resumed attacks against CF, but strategically positioned for an attempt to militarily take over Afghanistan once CF withdraws. ⁵ ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~

Taliban media will continue to highlight battlefield victories in propaganda, while aggressively countering any criticism. ^{7,8} ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~



- Overrun district centers in MAY
- Taliban encroaching on Provincial Center
- Taliban control segment of routes into Kabul
- Locally brokered ANDSF surrenders



ANDSF RESPONSE

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~

ANDSF's capability to reinforce and resupply vulnerable provinces likely degraded as ANDSF overextended. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~

ANDSF conducting SF and attempting resupply operations in Logar, Laghman, Baghlan, and Kabul. ¹⁰ ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~

203rd Corps contemplating reinforcing checkpoints along Highway 1 in Sayyidabad, Wardak, or retrograding from the area; retrograde option would threaten control of Highway 1 into Kabul. ¹¹ ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~

201st Corps repositioned ASSF to eastern Nangarhar and will rotate ASSF through western Nangarhar to maintain pressure on Taliban/secure GLOC. ¹³ ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~

Afghan Air Force redirected to support 217th Corps efforts in Baghlan-e Jadid, temporarily halting operations in Kunduz. ¹⁴ ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~

ASSESSMENT

The Taliban almost certainly will continue to encroach on Kabul and focus operations along main GLOCs, likely avoiding actions that will negatively impact CF retrograde. The Taliban likely will amplify battlefield victories and surrenders to encourage additional ANDSF defections and portray GIRoA as weak. Kabul likely will reposition ASSF units to defend populated areas under pressure and key approaches to the capital, which very likely will cede additional rural and suburban terrain to the Taliban. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)~~

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AFGHANISTAN: Unity Council Faces Challenges to Realizing Full Potential (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

J22-Afghanistan | (b)(6)

14 JUN 2021



PROPOSED COUNCIL (U)

President Ghani is seeking to convene a new leadership unity council to confer on fundamental peace and security issues. ¹

Composition expected to include 18 political leaders, including 12 GIROA officials. ²

Proposed council is expected to include the peace process, economic, social and security issues, and participation of key ministers and officials.



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POWERBROKERS HESITANT (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

Powerbrokers consider consultation critical as CF withdraw, but want Ghani to cede some authority to the council. ⁴

Mid-JUN: Level of decision-making authority undetermined; proposal calls for one-member-one-vote majority rule. ^{5, 6}

As of MAY: Ghani says council will be consultative, but final decisions are his. ⁷

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REQUIRED PARTICIPATION

Council success likely will hinge on the level of support from key Afghan stakeholders whose involvement Ghani has not yet secured

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OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS (U)

An inclusive, representative, authoritative council could serve as a platform for transitioning toward a governing relationship with the Taliban that resolves the conflict. ¹²

OPPORTUNITY

Creates a forum for key stakeholders to determine Afghanistan's future.

Could serve to facilitate transition from GIROA to a new governing structure as part of peace settlement.

Build cohesion by alleviating concerns of powerbrokers who are frustrated with Ghani's level of authority.

Enables allocation of GIROA and ANDSF resources to points of need through discussion.

RISK

Members of Parliament threatened by new deliberative body may leverage local influence to undercut GIROA cohesion.

Powerbrokers might use deliberative process to seek additional concessions from Ghani, gridlocking decision-making.

New council further weakens Constitutional norms and local perceptions of rule of law.

Excluded powerbrokers may seek alternative and parallel paths to secure interests at the expense of GIROA cohesion.

ASSESSMENT

Ghani's effort to form this council likely remains largely aspirational as internal political divisions and competition for influence impede its formation and effectiveness. Western support for the council may encourage broader participation by Afghan powerbrokers who are calculating how best to navigate the CF withdrawal and secure their long-term interests. (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

CF - Coalition Forces

Source: official GIROA Twitter

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

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AFGHANISTAN: ANDSF Capabilities Update (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

J22-Afghanistan

16 JUN 2021

ANDSF LOSE CONTROL OF SEVERAL GLOCs (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

(b)(1)1.4c

Early JUN: Ground forces stalled in Laghman due to high IED threat on RTE Nebraska.² (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

4 JUN: The Taliban overran ANDSF outposts along stretch of Highway 1 that links 209th Corps HQ with 1st and 2nd Bdes.³ (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

4 JUN: ANDSF lost Yakhchal Patrol Base, the last effective 215th Corps patrol base along the segment of Highway 1, severing key 215th/205th GLOC.⁴ (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

ANA FORCE STRENGTH

As of 12 JUN, the ANA has lost approximately 4,200 personnel in five months, double the historical rate observed since 2015.^{11, 12}

ANA Force Strength (Per APPS data as of 10 APR 2021; actual on hand strength likely lower)



STATUS OF MAJOR ROADS AND CHECKPOINTS (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)


Routes and Checkpoints Legend:

Checkpoint Status

- Operational checkpoints
- Checkpoints lost as of 1 MAY

Usability of Main Supply Routes

- Usable route
- Contested route
- Denied route



ASSESSMENT

Current activity likely demonstrates Taliban intent to isolate and potentially assault multiple provincial capitals simultaneously following Coalition Forces retrograde. ANDSF likely will need to prioritize defense of provincial capitals at the expense of leaving rural terrain vulnerable to Taliban capture due to anticipated logistics challenges. (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0517

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AFGHANISTAN: Kabul Stability Overview

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

J22-Afghanistan (b)(6)

23 JUN 2021



TALIBAN PROGRESS

Likely Taliban objectives prior to shifting focus on Kabul.

- ◆ Lashkar Gah
- ◆ Tarin Kot
- ◆ Qalat
- Kandahar
- ▲ Pul-e Khumri
- ◆ Ghazni
- ▲ Mehtar Lam
- Jalalabad

Partially Observed (Moderate): Taliban block or seize control of the provincial capital or the Taliban contests control of a district center directly bordering the provincial capital.

Partially Observed (Significant): Taliban block or seize control of multiple GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize a district center directly bordering the provincial capital.

Observed: Taliban is in control of all key GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize more than one district center directly bordering the provincial capital.

The capture of these areas or surrounding GLOCs like would not necessitate a direct threat to U.S. retrograde, Hamid Karzi International Airport (HKIA), or the U.S. Embassy; would increase the risk of GIROA/ANDSF instability.




KABUL DEFENSE

Indicators of ANDSF instability in Kabul

- Highway 1 blocked (Maidan Shahr)
- Route Utah blocked (Muhammad Aghah)
- Highway 7 blocked
- Interdiction along routes between Bagram and Kabul
- Increase in high-profile attacks in Kabul City
- 111th unable to conduct sustainment operations
- Influx of Taliban fighters into districts around Kabul city
- Air infrastructure being targeted/degraded
- Taliban propaganda infiltrated into Kabul City
- Risk to the U.S. Embassy being seized or sieged
- Risk to long term HKIA shut down

AFGHANISTAN - TALIBAN PATH TO KABUL (AS OF 21 JUN)



Source: CENTCOM | NGA G&S Branch

WHAT'S NEXT?

STAGE 1	STAGE 2	STAGE 3
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taliban seek to control GLOCs in districts directly connecting to Kabul Taliban isolate ANA Corps outside of Kabul to degrade ANDSF reinforcement Taliban begin to stage men, weapons, and equipment along main Kabul supply routes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taliban leverage control of GLOCs to infiltrate Kabul police districts; distribute propaganda and facilitate high-profile attacks. Taliban propagate IO success to stage protest/demonstrations in Kabul Taliban actively begin to interrupt main supply chains into Kabul 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taliban begin to seize control of outer districts in Kabul Province Taliban use high-profile attacks/civil unrest to overwhelm ANDSF's crisis response ability Taliban garner control of ground supply routes into Kabul

Observed ▲ Partially Observed (Significant) □ Partially Observed (Moderate) ● Unobserved



GIROA/ANDSF

Indicators of Institutional Collapse

- Flight of civilian ministerial leaders, provincial governors, members of parliament
- ◆ President of Afghanistan removes leaders in the security pillars and replaces them with loyalists
- Powerbrokers undermine GIROA by usurping government authority or removing GIROA officials
- ◆ Powerbrokers/opposition seek independent arrangements outside of GIROA
- Reduction of donor funding to GIROA
- ▲ Loss of public confidence in GIROA's ability to provide stability
- Rapid growth of informal IDP camps or refugee migrations
- Flight of MOD/MOI leadership, general staff, or operational commanders
- Refusal of orders/unresponsiveness to Kabul civilian authorities
- ▲ Unit desertions/defections
- Operational/tactical leaders deference to local power structures
- Collusion for forceful removal of President/civilian appointed leadership.
- Collusion between operational/tactical leadership and the Taliban

Potential Accelerants

- President Ghani's resignation, assassination, or death
- Taliban shifts strategy to focus on capturing Kabul
- Negative Taliban reaction to remaining security personnel at HKIA/U.S. Embassy
- Warlords capitulate or join the Taliban
- Complete diplomatic withdrawal
- Senior ANDSF (brigade or above) and subordinates capitulate or join the Taliban

ASSESSMENT

The Taliban likely intends to isolate Kabul and increase high-profile attacks to pressure GIROA into a political settlement favoring the Taliban. ANDSF almost certainly is capable of responding to high-profile attacks in the national capital. As Kabul becomes increasingly vulnerable to Taliban operations, the risk to U.S. Embassy staff almost certainly increases. Upon the Taliban's shift in strategy to focus efforts on the capital, conditions likely will degrade rapidly with little warning.

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY



AFGHANISTAN: Taliban Focus Military Pressure on DCs (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

J22-Afghanistan

23 JUN 2021

TALIBAN TARGETS DCs; GENERATING MOMENTUM THROUGH IO (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)


The Taliban is using DC overruns combined with an aggressive IO campaign to generate momentum and weaken ANDSF morale and cohesion. (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

Throughout MAY and JUN, the Taliban released numerous media statements highlighting ANDSF surrenders and DC overruns. 1,2,3 (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

1 MAY – 15 JUN: The Taliban reportedly overran more than 35 DCs; at least 30 purportedly in early JUN. 4,5,6,7,8,9,10, 11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18, 19, 20, 22, 23,24,25,26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35,36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

The Taliban likely is focusing smaller-scale attacks on isolated DCs to limit massing against larger targets prior to U.S. retrograde; without an arrest in momentum, Taliban leadership may consider larger scale attacks on PCs prior to full retrograde. (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

REPORTED DISTRICT CENTER OVERRUNS 1 MAY - 15 JUN (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)



ASSESSMENT

The Taliban likely is leveraging territory gained in 2020 to capture vulnerable DCs, particularly as ANDSF morale wavers. The Taliban almost certainly will use seized terrain and material for offensives into neighboring districts; likely intent on isolating PCs and ultimately launching assaults on cities post withdrawal. (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

DC – District Center | IO – Information Operations | PC – Provincial Capital

Page 102 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)50USC3024(i)

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Page 103 redacted for the following reason:

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AFGHANISTAN: Kabul Stability Overview

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

J22-Afghanistan | (b)(6)

2 July 2021



TALIBAN PROGRESS

LIKELY TALIBAN OBJECTIVES PRIOR TO SHIFTING FOCUS ON KABUL

- Lashkar Gah** Partially Observed (Moderate): Taliban block or seize control of the provincial capital or the Taliban contests control of a district center directly bordering the provincial capital.
- Tarin Kot** Partially Observed (Moderate): Taliban block or seize control of the provincial capital or the Taliban contests control of a district center directly bordering the provincial capital.
- Qalat** Partially Observed (Moderate): Taliban block or seize control of the provincial capital or the Taliban contests control of a district center directly bordering the provincial capital.
- Kandahar** Partially Observed (Significant): Taliban block or seize control of multiple GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize a district center directly bordering the provincial capital.
- Pu-le Khumri** Partially Observed (Significant): Taliban block or seize control of multiple GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize a district center directly bordering the provincial capital.
- Ghazni** Partially Observed (Significant): Taliban block or seize control of multiple GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize a district center directly bordering the provincial capital.
- Mehtar Lam** Observed: Taliban is in control of all key GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize more than one district center directly bordering the provincial capital.
- Jalalabad** Observed: Taliban is in control of all key GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize more than one district center directly bordering the provincial capital.


The capture of these areas or surrounding GLOCs likely would not necessitate a direct threat to U.S. retrograde, Hamid Karzi International Airport (HKIA), or the U.S. Embassy; would increase the risk of GiRoA/ANDSF instability.



KABUL DEFENSE INDICATORS OF ANDSF INSTABILITY IN KABUL

- Highway 1 blocked (Maidan Shahr) 1-6
- Route Utah blocked (Muhammad Aghah) 7
- Highway 7 blocked (Sarobi)
- Interdiction along routes between Bagram and Kabul 8-9
- Increase in high-profile attacks in Kabul City
- 111th unable to conduct sustainment operations
- Influx of Taliban fighters into districts around Kabul city
- Air infrastructure being targeted/degraded
- Taliban propaganda infiltrated into Kabul City
- Risk to the U.S. Embassy being seized or sieged
- Risk to long term HKIA shut down

AFGHANISTAN - TALIBAN PATH TO KABUL (AS OF 30 JUNE)



ANDSF Disposition Data as of 22 June.



WHAT'S NEXT?

STAGE 1	STAGE 2	STAGE 3
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taliban seek to control GLOCs in districts directly connecting to Kabul Taliban isolate ANA Corps outside of Kabul to degrade ANDSF reinforcement Taliban begin to stage men, weapons, and equipment along main Kabul supply routes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taliban leverage control of GLOCs to infiltrate Kabul police districts; distribute propaganda and facilitate high-profile attacks (HPA). Taliban propagate IO success to stage protest/demonstrations in Kabul Taliban actively begin to interrupt main supply chains into Kabul 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taliban begin to seize control of outer districts in Kabul Province Taliban use HPA/civil unrest to overwhelm ANDSF's crisis response ability Taliban garner control of ground supply routes into Kabul

Change +/- Observed Partially Observed (Significant) Partially Observed (Moderate) Unobserved



GIROA/ANDSF

INDICATORS OF INSTITUTIONAL COLLAPSE

- Flight of civilian ministerial leaders, provincial governors, members of parliament
- President of Afghanistan removes leaders in the security pillars and replaces them with loyalists
- Powerbrokers undermine GiRoA by usurping government authority or removing GiRoA officials
- Powerbrokers/opposition seek independent arrangements outside of GiRoA
- Reduction of donor funding to GiRoA
- Loss of public confidence in GiRoA's ability to provide stability
- Rapid growth of informal IDP camps or refugee migrations
- Flight of MOD/MOI leadership, general staff, or operational commanders
- Refusal of orders/unresponsiveness to Kabul civilian authorities
- Unit desertions/defections
- Operational/tactical leaders deference to local power structures
- Collusion for forceful removal of President/civilian appointed leadership.
- Collusion between operational/tactical leadership and the Taliban

POTENTIAL ACCELERATORS

- President Ghani's resignation, assassination, or death
- Taliban shifts strategy to focus on capturing Kabul
- Negative Taliban reaction to remaining security to embassy at HKIA/U.S. Embassy
- Warlords capitulate or join the Taliban
- Complete diplomatic withdrawal
- Senior ANDSF (brigade or above) and subordinates capitulate or join the Taliban

ASSESSMENT

The Taliban likely intends to isolate Kabul and increase HPAs to pressure GiRoA into a political settlement favoring the Taliban. ANDSF almost certainly is capable of responding to HPAs in the national capital. As Kabul becomes increasingly vulnerable to Taliban operations, the risk to U.S. Embassy staff almost certainly increases. Upon the Taliban's shift in strategy to focus efforts on the capital, conditions likely will degrade rapidly with little warning.



AFGHANISTAN: Kabul Stability Overview (Cont.)

J22-Afghanistan | (b)(6)

2 July 2021

INDICATOR CHANGES SINCE LAST UPDATE (21 JUNE)



TALIBAN PROGRESS (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

LIKELY TALIBAN OBJECTIVES PRIOR TO SHIFTING FOCUS ON KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



◆ Pul-e Khumri

Observed: Taliban is in control of all key GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize more than one district center directly bordering the provincial capital. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Taliban gained control of Baghlan-e Jahid and Dahanah-ye Ghori DTs, bordering Pul-e Khumri DT, along with Doshi DT shifting between Taliban and ANDSF control over the last week. ¹⁰ (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMAL)



KABUL DEFENSE (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

INDICATORS OF ANDSF INSTABILITY IN KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



☐ Interdiction along routes between Bagram and Kabul

Taliban temporarily seizing control of Shinwari DT, Parwan PV, and planning to establish blocking positions in Charikar DT, Parwan PV, temporarily increases the risk to partially overserved.

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c



GIROA/ANDSF (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

INDICATORS OF INSTITUTIONAL COLLAPSE (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



◆ Unit desertions/defections

ANDSF surrenders over the past week have resulted in approximately a brigade worth of defections/desertions over the last 60 days. This is an unsustainable rate of desertions which threatens overall force viability if sustained. ¹³ (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMAL)

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AFGHANISTAN: Indicators of Collapse - Desertions/Defections Overview (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

J22-Afghanistan | (b)(6)

12 JUL 2021

(b)(1)1.4c

Afghan Personnel Pay System (APPS) strengths likely do not reflect abandonments, desertions, and losses reported in past two weeks; force strengths almost certainly lower for units under heavy pressure, especially in northeastern Afghanistan. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)


(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA)

Battlefield pressures increased as the Taliban continued to capture district centers and contest control of LOCs/GLOCs, resulting in ongoing desertions/defections of security personnel. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

JUN: 565 ANDSF surrendered after the Azrah District in Logar was overrun; surrender likely due to long period without resupply.¹ (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Late JUN: In Faryab, 300 security personnel surrendered after reinforcements did not show; 24 commandos and 16 General Command of Police Special Units surrendered after isolation without ammunition.²³ (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

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Source: CCJ2Graphics_202107_020

ANDSF/GIRoA are attempting to compensate for the loss of security personnel through recruitment, retention efforts, consolidation of forces, and reliance on militias to sustain combat effectiveness. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

MAY: GIRoA relied on militias to bolster defense; reinforced recruitment and retention efforts to sustain combat effectiveness against Taliban.⁶⁷ (S//NF)

JUL: (b)(6) requested recruitment of People's Uprising Militia (PUM) into the Afghan National Army-Territorial Forces (ANA-TF); President Ghani approved 30,000 new ANA-TF positions to accommodate recruitment.⁸ (S//REL TO USA, RSMA)

(b)(1)1.4c

JUL: ANA recruitment challenged due to lack of morale and increased Taliban gains; GIRoA building PUM instead of funneling recruits into ANA.¹⁰ (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

ASSESSMENT

Some brigade-level units likely are at risk of becoming non-combat capable over the next 90 days due to the rate of desertions/defections threatening the viability of forces and combat sustainment. Taliban pressure very likely will continue to spread across the country as the group takes district centers and threatens provincial capitals. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

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AFGHANISTAN: Kabul Stability Overview (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

J22-Afghanistan | (b)(6)

10 July 2021



TALIBAN PROGRESS (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

LIKELY TALIBAN OBJECTIVES PRIOR TO SHIFTING FOCUS ON KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- Lashkar Gah** **Partially Observed (Moderate):** Taliban block or seize a GLOC leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban contests control of a district center directly bordering the provincial capital. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Tarin Kot**
- Qalat**
- Kandahar** **Partially Observed (Significant):** Taliban block or seize control of multiple GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize a district center directly bordering the provincial capital. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Pul-e Khumri**
- Ghazni**
- Mehtar Lam** **Observed:** Taliban is in control of all key GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize more than one district center directly bordering the provincial capital. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Jalalabad**

The capture of these areas or surrounding GLOCs likely would not necessitate a direct threat to U.S. retrograde, Hamid Karzi International Airport (HKIA), or the U.S. Embassy; would increase the risk of GiRoA/ANDSF instability. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)




KABUL DEFENSE (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

INDICATORS OF ANDSF INSTABILITY IN KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- Highway 1 blocked (Maidan Shahr) 1-6
- Route Utah blocked (Muhammad Aghah) 7-9
- Interdiction along routes between Bagram & Kabul 10-11
- Highway-7 blocked (Sarobi) 12-15
- Increase in high-profile attacks (HPA) in Kabul City 16-18
- 111th unable to conduct sustainment operations
- Influx of Taliban fighters into districts around Kabul city
- Air infrastructure targeted/degraded
- Taliban propaganda infiltrated into Kabul City
- Risk of the U.S. Embassy being seized or sieged
- Risk of long-term HKIA shut down

AFGHANISTAN - TALIBAN PATH TO KABUL (AS OF 8 JULY) (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSM)



GIROA/ANDSF (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

INDICATORS OF INSTITUTIONAL COLLAPSE (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- Flight of civilian ministerial leaders, provincial governors, members of parliament
- President of Afghanistan removes leaders in the security pillars and replaces them with loyalists
- Powerbrokers undermine GiRoA by usurping government authority or removing GiRoA officials
- Powerbrokers/opposition seek independent arrangements outside of GiRoA
- Reduction of donor funding to GiRoA
- Loss of public confidence in GiRoA's ability to provide stability
- Rapid growth of informal IDP camps or refugee migrations
- Flight of MOD/MOI leadership, general staff, or operational commanders
- Refusal of orders/unresponsiveness to Kabul civilian authorities
- Unit desertions/defections
- Operational/tactical leaders defer to local power structures
- Collusion for forceful removal of President/civilian appointed leadership.
- Collusion between operational/tactical leadership and the Taliban

POTENTIAL ACCELERANTS (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- President Ghani's resignation, assassination, or death
- Taliban shifts strategy to focus on capturing Kabul
- Negative Taliban reaction to remaining security personnel at HKIA/U.S. Embassy
- Warlords capitulate or join the Taliban
- Complete diplomatic withdrawal
- Senior ANDSF (brigade or above) and subordinates capitulate or join the Taliban



WHAT'S NEXT? (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

STAGE 1	STAGE 2	STAGE 3
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taliban seek to control GLOCs in districts directly connecting to Kabul Taliban isolate ANA Corps outside of Kabul to degrade ANDSF reinforcement Taliban begin to stage men, weapons, and equipment along main Kabul supply routes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taliban leverage control of GLOCs to infiltrate Kabul police districts; distribute propaganda and facilitate HPA. Taliban propagate IO success to stage protests/demonstrations in Kabul Taliban actively begin to interrupt main supply chains into Kabul 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taliban begin to seize control of outer districts in Kabul Province Taliban use HPA/civil unrest to overwhelm ANDSF's crisis response ability Taliban garner control of ground supply routes into Kabul

Change +/- Observed Partially Observed (Significant) Partially Observed (Moderate) Unobserved

(b)(1)1.4c



AFGHANISTAN: Kabul Stability Overview (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

10 July 2021

INDICATOR CHANGES SINCE LAST UPDATE (30 JUNE)



TALIBAN PROGRESS (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

LIKELY TALIBAN OBJECTIVES PRIOR TO SHIFTING FOCUS ON KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



Kandahar

Observed: Taliban is in control of all key GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize more than one district center directly bordering the provincial capital. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Taliban gained control of Panjawai District, bordering Dand District. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



KABUL DEFENSE (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

INDICATORS OF ANDSF INSTABILITY IN KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



Highway-7 blocked (Sarobi)

The Taliban has increased pressure on Sarobi District by seizing three bordering districts (Hisarak, Bad Pech, and Tagab). The increased freedom of movement likely has resulted in the intensification of attacks on CPs in Sarobi and reported ANDSF surrenders. Although HWY-7 remains open, the threat of interdiction is increased based on recent Taliban gains. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



KABUL DEFENSE (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

INDICATORS OF ANDSF INSTABILITY IN KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



Increase in high-profile attacks in Kabul City

(b)(1)1.4c



KABUL DEFENSE (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

INDICATORS OF ANDSF INSTABILITY IN KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



- Risk of the U.S. Embassy being seized or sieged
- Risk of long-term HKIA shut down

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AFGHANISTAN: Kabul Stability Overview (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

J22-Afghanistan

22 JUL 2021



TALIBAN PROGRESS (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

DISTRICTS THAT ARE CRITICAL TO ANDSF'S ABILITY TO DEFEND KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- ◆ Maidan Shahr **Partially Observed (Moderate):** Taliban block or seize a GLOC leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban contests control of a district center directly bordering the provincial capital. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◆ Mehtar Lam **Partially Observed (Significant):** Taliban block or seize control of multiple GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize a district center directly bordering the provincial capital. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Jalalabad **Partially Observed (Significant):** Taliban block or seize control of multiple GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize a district center directly bordering the provincial capital. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Charikar **Partially Observed (Significant):** Taliban block or seize control of multiple GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize a district center directly bordering the provincial capital. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◆ Pul-e Khumri **Observed:** Taliban is in control of all key GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize more than one district center directly bordering the provincial capital. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◆ Aibak **Observed:** Taliban is in control of all key GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize more than one district center directly bordering the provincial capital. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

The capture of these areas would threaten the security of HKIA and the U.S. Embassy, but our ability to provide early warning of their loss is diminished due to limited collection. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)




KABUL DEFENSE (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

INDICATORS OF ANDSF INSTABILITY IN KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- Highway 1 blocked (Maidan Shahr) 1-6
- Route Utah blocked (Muhammad Aghah) 7-9
- Interdiction along routes between Bagram and Kabul¹⁰
- Highway-7 blocked (Sarobi) 11-19
- Increase in HPAs in Kabul City 20-23
- 111th unable to conduct sustainment operations
- Influx of fighters into districts around Kabul city 24
- Air infrastructure targeted/degraded
- Taliban propaganda infiltrated into Kabul City
- Risk of the U.S. Embassy being seized or sieged
- Risk of long-term HKIA shut down (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

AFGHANISTAN - TALIBAN PATH TO KABUL (AS OF 21 JUL) (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMIA)



ANDSF DISPOSITION DATA AS OF 21 JUL (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMIA)



WHAT'S NEXT? (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

STAGE 1	STAGE 2	STAGE 3
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taliban seek to control GLOCs in districts bordering Kabul Taliban isolate ANA corps outside of Kabul to block ANDSF reinforcement capability Taliban begin to stage men, weapons, and equipment along main Kabul supply routes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taliban use GLOC control to infiltrate Kabul police districts; distribute propaganda and facilitate HPAs. Taliban propagate IO success to stage protests/demonstrations in Kabul Taliban actively begin to interrupt main supply chains into Kabul 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taliban begin seizing control of outer districts in Kabul Province Taliban use HPAs/civil unrest to disrupt ANDSF's crisis response ability Taliban gain uncontested control of ground supply routes into Kabul

Change +/- ◆ Observed ▲ Partially Observed (Significant) □ Partially Observed (Moderate) ● Unobserved ✕ Captured



GIROA/ANDSF (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

INDICATORS OF INSTITUTIONAL COLLAPSE (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- Flight of civilian ministerial leaders, provincial governors, members of parliament
- ◆ President of Afghanistan removes leaders in the security pillars and replaces them with loyalists
- Powerbrokers undermine GIROA by usurping government authority or removing GIROA officials
- ◆ Powerbrokers/opposition seek independent arrangements outside of GIROA
- Reduction of donor funding to GIROA
- ▲ Loss of public confidence in GIROA's ability to provide stability
- Rapid growth of unofficial IDP camps or refugee migrations
- Flight of MOD/MOI leadership, general staff, or operational commanders
- ANDSF refusal of orders/unresponsiveness to Kabul civilian authorities
- ◆ Unit desertions/defections
- Operational/tactical leaders defer to local power structures
- Collusion for forceful removal of President/civilian appointed leadership.
- Collusion between operational/tactical leadership and the Taliban (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

POTENTIAL ACCELERANTS (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- President Ghani's resignation, assassination, or death
- Taliban shifts strategy to focus on capturing Kabul or the Taliban
- Negative Taliban reaction to remaining Coalition security personnel at HKIA/U.S. Embassy
- Warlords capitulate or join the Taliban
- Complete diplomatic withdrawal
- Senior ANDSF (brigade or above) and subordinates capitulate or join the Taliban

HKIA - Hamid Karzai International Airport | HPA - High Profile Attack

(b)(1)1.4c



AFGHANISTAN: Kabul Stability Overview (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

CHANGES SINCE 8 JUL UPDATE

TALIBAN PROGRESS (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
 LIKELY TALIBAN OBJECTIVES PRIOR TO SHIFTING FOCUS ON KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

(b)(1)1.4c

National Focus

Kabul Focus

We assess the Taliban successfully isolated areas prioritized in its campaign plan, and could shift its operational priority to seizing Kabul with little warning. We are now focused on monitoring indicators for this shift in priority. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

The capture of these areas or surrounding GLOCs likely would not threaten U.S. retrograde, HKIA, or the U.S. Embassy, but very likely would increase the risk of GIRA/ANDSF instability. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

TALIBAN PROGRESS (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
 DISTRICTS THAT ARE CRITICAL TO ANDSF'S ABILITY TO DEFEND KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- ◆ Maidan Shahr Partially Observed (Moderate): Taliban block or seize a GLOC leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban contests control of a district center directly bordering the provincial capital. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◆ Mehtar Lam
- Jalalabad Partially Observed (Significant): Taliban block or seize control of multiple GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize a district center directly bordering the provincial capital. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Charikar
- ◆ Pul-e Khumri Observed: Taliban is in control of all key GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize more than one district center directly bordering the provincial capital. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◆ Aibak

(b)(1)1.4c

KABUL DEFENSE (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
 INDICATORS OF ANDSF INSTABILITY IN KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

● Interdiction along routes between Bagram and Kabul
 There has not been any Taliban progress in achieving this goal the last two weeks; ANDSF has also decreased pressure on the routes by securing DTs in western Parwan PV. ²⁵ (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

KABUL DEFENSE (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
 INDICATORS OF ANDSF INSTABILITY IN KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

▲ Highway-7 blocked (Sarobi)
 The ANDSF lost control of multiple checkpoints/bases over the last week in Sarobi District; intentional retrogrades make up the majority of losses; however, the loss of territory in the district, the loss of bordering districts, and retrograde of equipment such as D-30s, indicates a worsening security situation around Highway-7. ²⁶⁻³² (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

KABUL DEFENSE (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
 INDICATORS OF ANDSF INSTABILITY IN KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

▲ Influx of Taliban fighters into districts around Kabul city
 Reporting suggests fighters from bordering provinces are returning from victories with cross-leveled men, weapons, and equipment; as the Taliban begins to consolidate gains in bordering provinces, the risk to districts on the periphery of Kabul City will continue to increase. ³³ (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

TALIBAN PROGRESS (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
 LIKELY TALIBAN OBJECTIVES PRIOR TO SHIFTING FOCUS ON KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- ◆ Kandahar

Observed: Taliban is in control of all key GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize more than one district center directly bordering the provincial capital. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Taliban gained control of Zarhey District, bordering Dand District, and Spin Boldak District, containing a key GLOC to Pakistan. ²⁵ (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RUMA)

TALIBAN PROGRESS (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
 LIKELY TALIBAN OBJECTIVES PRIOR TO SHIFTING FOCUS ON KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- ◆ Mehtar Lam

Observed: Taliban is in control of all key GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize more than one district center directly bordering the provincial capital. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Taliban gained control of Alisheng and Alingar Districts, bordering Mehtar Lam District. ²⁵ (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RUMA)

ASSESSMENT

The Taliban isolated a majority of provincial capitals along the Ring Road and took control of key border crossings adjacent to major population centers, almost certainly shaping the environment for a move on Kabul. The Taliban almost certainly will increase political and military pressure to pursue a negotiated surrender of provincial capitals, while attempting to gain additional territory around Kabul. In response, the ANDSF likely will continue reinforcing districts surrounding Kabul, consolidating defenses in Sarobi to protect Highway 7 and establishing new blocking positions in Kapisa Province. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

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AFGHANISTAN: Indicators of Collapse - Flight of Leadership Overview Update

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

J22-Afghanistan | (b)(6)

23 JULY 2021



PREPARING FAMILIES

SENIOR SECURITY OFFICIALS PLANNING TO MOVE FAMILIES OUT OF AFGHANISTAN (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Government and Senior security officials are planning for degradation of security environment. There are no indications key senior leaders have permanently departed. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

(b)(1)1.4c

MAY: (b)(6) requested U.S. support relocating herself and family, due to past assassination attempts and threats.² (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

JUNE: Gul Agha Sherzai feared for his and his family's personal safety, due to Taliban retributions for his support to Coalition Forces.^{3,4} (S//NF)

(b)(1)1.4c



GIRoA INCENTIVIZING OFFICIALS TO STAY

MEMBERS OF GIRoA PLEAD RANKING OFFICIALS TO REMAIN IN COUNTRY (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Permanent departures of senior officials almost certainly will degrade cohesion and overall functionality of GIRoA. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

JULY: (b)(6) incentivized parliamentary members to stay in Afghanistan and not flee to other countries.⁷ (S//NF)

JULY: PoA Ghani met with retired ANDSF officials to find ways to protect territorial integrity and national identity.⁸ (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

ASSESSMENT

Currently-observed leadership flights likely are not contributing to GIRoA's degrading cohesion, but senior officials continue to plan exit strategies, likely in preparation for expected Taliban offensives against provincial capitals and attacks in Kabul City. Taliban successes against major population centers likely will trigger increased leadership flight moving forward. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

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AFGHANISTAN: Kabul Stability Overview (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

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J22-Afghanistan | (b)(6)

29 JUL 2021



TALIBAN PROGRESS (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

DISTRICTS CRITICAL TO ANDSF'S ABILITY TO DEFEND KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)


- ◆ Maidan Shahr **Partially Observed (Moderate):** Taliban block or seize a GLOC leading to the provincial capital, or the Taliban contests control of a district center directly bordering the provincial capital. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
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- Jalalabad **Partially Observed (Significant):** Taliban block or seize control of multiple GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize a district center directly bordering the provincial capital. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Charikar **Partially Observed (Significant):** Taliban block or seize control of multiple GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize a district center directly bordering the provincial capital. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◆ Pul-e Khumri **Observed:** Taliban is in control of all key GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize more than one district center directly bordering the provincial capital. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- ◆ Aibak **Observed:** Taliban is in control of all key GLOCs leading to the provincial capital or the Taliban seize more than one district center directly bordering the provincial capital. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

The capture of these areas would threaten the security of HKIA and the U.S. Embassy; our ability to provide early warning of their loss is diminished due to limited collection. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



KABUL DEFENSE INDICATORS OF ANDSF INSTABILITY IN KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- ▲ Highway 1 blocked (Maidan Shahr) 1-6
- Route Utah blocked (Muhammad Aghah) 7-9
- Interdiction along routes between Bagram and Kabul¹⁰
- ▲ Highway-7 blocked (Sarobi) 11-19
- Increase in HPAs in Kabul City 20-23
- 111th unable to conduct sustainment operations
- Influx of fighters into districts around Kabul city 24
- Air infrastructure targeted/degraded
- Taliban propaganda infiltrated into Kabul City
- Risk of the U.S. Embassy being seized or sieged
- Risk of long-term HKIA shut down (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



ANDSF DISPOSITION DATA AS OF 14-28 JUL (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RQMA)



WHAT'S NEXT? (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

STAGE 1	STAGE 2	STAGE 3
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taliban seek to control GLOCs in districts bordering Kabul Taliban isolate ANA corps outside of Kabul to block ANDSF reinforcement capability Taliban begin to stage men, weapons, and equipment along main Kabul supply routes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taliban use GLOC control to infiltrate Kabul police districts; distribute propaganda and facilitate HPAs. Taliban propagate IO success to stage protests/demonstrations in Kabul Taliban actively begin to interrupt main supply chains into Kabul 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taliban begin seizing control of outer districts in Kabul Province Taliban use HPAs/civil unrest to disrupt ANDSF's crisis response ability Taliban gain uncontested control of ground supply routes into Kabul

Change +/- ◆ Observed ▲ Partially Observed (Significant) □ Partially Observed (Moderate) ● Unobserved ✕ Captured



GIRoA/ANDSF (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

INDICATORS OF INSTITUTIONAL COLLAPSE (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- Flight of civilian ministerial leaders, provincial governors, members of parliament
- ◆ President of Afghanistan removes leaders in the security pillars and replaces them with loyalists
- Powerbrokers undermine GIRoA by usurping government authority or removing GIRoA officials
- ◆ Powerbrokers/opposition seek independent arrangements outside of GIRoA
- Reduction of donor funding to GIRoA
- ▲ Loss of public confidence in GIRoA's ability to provide stability
- Rapid growth of unofficial IDP camps or refugee migrations
- Flight of MOD/MOI leadership, general staff, or operational commanders
- ANDSF refusal of orders/unresponsiveness to Kabul civilian authorities
- ◆ Unit desertions/defections
- Operational/tactical leaders defer to local power structures
- Collusion for forceful removal of President/civilian appointed leadership.
- Collusion between operational/tactical leadership and the Taliban (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

POTENTIAL ACCELERANTS (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- President Ghani's resignation, assassination, or death
- Taliban shifts strategy to focus on capturing Kabul
- Negative Taliban reaction to remaining Coalition security personnel at HKIA/U.S. Embassy
- Warlords capitulate or join the Taliban
- Complete diplomatic withdrawal
- Senior ANDSF (brigade or above) and subordinates capitulate or join the Taliban (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

HKIA - Hamid Karzai International Airport | HPA - High Profile Attack

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AFGHANISTAN: Kabul Stability Overview (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

CHANGES SINCE 21 JUL UPDATE



GIROA/ANDSF (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

INDICATORS OF INSTITUTIONAL COLLAPSE (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- Powerbrokers undermine GIROA by usurping government authority or removing GIROA officials

(b)(1)1.4c

ASSESSMENT

The Taliban sustained focus on isolating and conducting probing attacks on major population centers, shaping the environment for refugees to begin fleeing conflict areas. The Taliban almost certainly will increase political and military pressure to pursue a negotiated surrender of provincial capitals, while attempting to gain additional territory around Kabul. In response, the ANDSF has demonstrated moderate success in repelling probing attacks against population centers over the short term. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

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AFGHANISTAN: Kabul Stability Overview (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

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J22-Afghanistan | (b)(6)

5 August 2021



TALIBAN PROGRESS (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

DISTRICTS CRITICAL TO ANDSF'S ABILITY TO DEFEND KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)


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The capture of these areas would threaten the security of HKIA and the U.S. Embassy (b)(1)1.4c (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



KABUL DEFENSE INDICATORS OF ANDSF INSTABILITY IN KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- Highway 1 blocked (Maidan Shahr) 1-8
- Route Utah blocked (Muhammad Aghah) 8-11
- Interdiction along routes between Bagram and Kabul 12
- Highway-7 blocked (Sarobi) 13-21
- HPAs in Kabul City 22-25
- 111th Capacity to conduct operations
- Taliban contest districts in Kabul 26-27
- Air infrastructure targeted/degraded
- Anti-GIRoA / Pro-Taliban demonstrations in Kabul City
- Risk of the U.S. Embassy being seized or sieged
- Risk of long-term HKIA shut down (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



WHAT'S NEXT? (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

STAGE 1	STAGE 2	STAGE 3
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taliban seek to control GLOCs in districts bordering Kabul Taliban isolate ANA corps outside of Kabul to block ANDSF reinforcement capability Taliban begin to stage men, weapons, and equipment along main Kabul supply routes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taliban use GLOC control to infiltrate Kabul police districts; distribute propaganda and facilitate HPAs. Taliban propagate IO success to stage protests/demonstrations in Kabul Taliban actively begin to interrupt main supply chains into Kabul 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taliban begin seizing control of outer districts in Kabul Province Taliban use HPAs/civil unrest to disrupt ANDSF's crisis response ability Taliban gain uncontested control of ground supply routes into Kabul

Change +/- ◆ Observed ▲ Partially Observed (Significant) □ Partially Observed (Moderate) ● Unobserved ✕ Captured



GIROA/ANDSF INDICATORS OF INSTITUTIONAL COLLAPSE (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

INDICATORS OF INSTITUTIONAL COLLAPSE (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

(b)(1)1.4c

POTENTIAL ACCELERANTS (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- President Ghani's resignation, assassination, or death
- Taliban shifts strategy to focus on capturing Kabul or the U.S. Embassy
- Negative Taliban reaction to remaining Coalition security personnel at HKIA/U.S. Embassy
- Warlords capitulate or join the Taliban
- Complete diplomatic withdrawal
- Senior ANDSF (brigade or above) and subordinates capitulate or join the Taliban

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

HKIA - Hamid Karzai International Airport | HPA - High Profile Attack

ASSESSMENT

The Taliban is increasing efforts to assault and potentially gain control of provincial capitals in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces, while continuing to consolidate outside of Kabul Province. The Taliban likely maintains the ability to shift operational focus to Kabul with little to no warning. ANDSF almost certainly is capable of responding to HPAs in the national capital, demonstrated by its response to attacks on 3 AUG. Upon a Taliban shift in strategy to focus efforts on the capital, conditions likely will degrade rapidly with little warning, almost certainly increasing risk to U.S. Embassy staff. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

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AFGHANISTAN: Kabul Stability Overview (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

CHANGES SINCE 28 JUL UPDATE (U)

TALIBAN PROGRESS (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

(b)(1)1.4c



KABUL DEFENSE (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) INDICATORS OF ANDSF INSTABILITY IN KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



◆ HPAs in Kabul City 28-32

On 3 AUG an attack occurred near Bismullah Khan's house in PD-10 and near the Iranian Embassy in Police District-4, Kabul City; this attack, following the assassination of a Deputy Governor for Wardak Province in Kabul City earlier in the day, indicative of the decreased security situation in the city. 28-32 (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



KABUL DEFENSE (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) INDICATORS OF ANDSF INSTABILITY IN KABUL (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)



□ Taliban contest districts around Kabul

Operational reporting indicates the Taliban attacked an ANA base in Paghman District on 2 AUG; (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

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AFGHANISTAN: IDPs Likely Increase the Risk of Kabul Instability (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

J22-Afghanistan |

(b)(6)

10 August 2021

IDPS STRESS KABUL (U)

The IDP population in Kabul likely grew as fighting occurred in surrounding districts.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

2 AUG: GIROA pressed for the establishment of IDP camps in urban and border areas due to rising number of IDPs, according to a UN report. ¹ ~~(SBU//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

As of JUL: The Taliban leveraged IDP movements and infiltrated IDP camps to attack ANDSF. Residents in several provinces fled to capital city centers as fighting increased on the outskirts. ^{2,3} ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

Since JUN: Thousands of IDPs fleeing violence in their home province. Seeking shelter and security in host communities in Kabul. For some, Kabul is a secondary displacement destination. ^{4,5,6} ~~(S//REL TO USA, RSM/A)~~


NEO IMPLICATIONS (U)

NEO execution likely would increase public anxiety regarding GIROA's viability and risks civil unrest as thousands attempt to escape impending violence. ANDSF likely will be challenged to simultaneously manage increased IDP flows, civil unrest, and a deteriorating security environment, almost certainly complicating the NEO operating environment. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

ASSESSMENT

IDP flows into Kabul almost certainly will stress an already over-extended GIROA, potentially overwhelming its ability to provide security and basic services for the city. Deteriorating security within Kabul City likely portends increased Taliban or violent extremist organizations attacks that would further destabilize and erode public confidence in GIROA. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

KABUL CITY (S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSM/A)



IDP camp locations pulled from IOM data dated JUL 2020. Kabul Province hosts approximately 650,000 IDPs and returnees. ~~(S//NF) 121314~~

THREATS TO GIROA VIABILITY (U)

GIROA likely will struggle to provide security and basic services as violence increases near Kabul. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

4 AUG: The Taliban conducted a HPA against the acting Defense Minister and threatened more in Kabul. ISIS-Khorasan HPAs against pro-government and religious minority populations in Kabul occurred over the past year. ⁷⁸ ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

25 JUL: Kabul consumer goods prices doubled. Shopkeepers attempted to flee fearing a Taliban takeover. ⁹ ~~(S//NF)~~

As of JUN: Captured border crossings decreased GIROA revenue and caused a call for budget cuts, except defense and law enforcement. ¹⁰ ~~(SBU//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

As of MAR: Several protests for ending violence, responsible withdrawal of foreign forces, support for and against GIROA, and lack of services. Protests outside Western embassies demanding asylum rarely violent, but affected accessibility. ¹¹ (U)

HPA - High-Profile Attack

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